LESSONS OF THE CRIMEA. 15 



ever, while that of two or three line-of -battle ships would raise a considerable fortress. Whilst 

 the monster ironclad with heavy guns would deal out death and destruction when surrounded 

 by an enemy's fleet of lighter iron vessels or wooden ones as strong as was the Victory, she 

 would herself run great risk in approaching closely-fortified harbours and coasts, where a 

 single shot from a gun heavy enough to pierce her armour might sink her. Her safety would 

 consist in firing at long ranges and in steaming backwards and forwards. 



The lessons of the Crimean war, as regards the navy, were few, but of the gravest 

 importance, and they have led to results of which we cannot yet determine the end. The 

 war opened by a Russian attack on a Turkish squadron at Sinope, November 20th, 1853.* 

 That determined the fact that a whole fleet might be annihilated in an hour or so by 

 the use of large shells. No more necessity for grappling and close quarters; the iron 

 age was full in view, and wooden walls had outlived their usefulness, and must perish. 



But the lesson had to be again impressed, and that upon a large English and French 

 fleet. Yet, in fairness to our navy, it must be remembered that the Russians had spent 

 every attention to rendering Sebastopol nearly impregnable on the sea-side, while a dis- 

 tinguished writer, f who was present throughout the siege, assures us that until the pre- 

 ceding spring they had been quite indifferent in regard to the strength of the fortifications 

 on the land-side. And the presence of the allied fleets was the undeniable cause of one 

 Russian fleet being sunk in the harbour of Sebastopol, while another dared not venture 

 out, season after season, from behind stone fortresses in the shallow waters of Cronstadt.f 

 A great naval authority thinks that, while England was, at the time, almost totally 

 deficient in the class of vessels essential to attacking the fleets and fortifications of 

 Russia, the fact that the former never dared "to accept the challenge of any British 

 squadron, however small, is one the record of which we certainly may read without 

 shame." But of that period it would be more pleasant to write exultingly than 

 apologetically. 



When the Allies had decided to commence the bombardment of Sebastopol, on October 

 17th, 1854, it was understood that the fleet should co-operate, and that the attack should 

 be made by the line-of-battle ships in a semicircle. They were ready at one p.m. to commence 



* The Turks had at Sinope seven frigates, one sloop, two corvettes, and two transports. The Eussians were 

 stronger, but this did not determine the battle ; their success was won because they were well supplied with 

 large shells and shell-guns, while the Turks had nothing more effective than 24-pounders. Their wooden 

 vessels were speedily on fire, and the Russians won an easy success. Shells were no novelty, yet a great 

 sea-fight had never before been, as it was then, won by their exclusive agency. 



t The Hon. S. J. G. Calthorpe, " Letters from Head-quarters." 



t The seven Russian ships sunk at the entrance of the harbour of Sebastopol were of no small size or 

 value, and they were scuttled in a hurry so great that they had all their guns, ammunition, and stores on 

 board, and their rigging standing. They comprised five line-of-battle ships, two of them eighty, two eighty- 

 four, and one 120 guns, and two frigates of forty guns; a total of 528 guns. Afterwards it became a common 

 report that vessels had been disabled and sunk in the harbour. On the night of the 5th of September, just 

 before the evacuation of the town, two large Russian men-of-war caught fire and burned fiercely, illumining the 

 harbour and town, and causing great excitement, as an omen of coming doom. The night of the memorable 

 8th, when the Russians gave" up all further idea of resistance, and left the town to take care of itself, 

 witnessed the sinking of the remainder of the Black Sea fleet. So far, therefore, the presence of our fleet had 

 a pronounced moral effect, without involving further loss of life. 



