250 THE SEA. 



to the navy pound. The purser of those days was taken from an inferior class of men, and 

 often obtained his position by influence, rather than merit. He generally retired on a 

 competency after a life of deliberate dishonesty towards the defenders of his country, who, 

 had they received everything to which they were entitled, would not have been too well 

 treated, and, as it was, were cheated and robbed, without scruple and without limit. The 

 reader will recall the many naval novels, in which poor Jack's daily allowance of grog was 

 curtailed by the purveyor's thumb being put in the pannikin : this was the least of the 

 evils he suffered. In those war times the discipline of the service was specially rigid and 

 severe, and most of this was doubtless necessary. Men were not readily obtained in sufficient 

 numbers ; consequently, when in harbour, leave ashore was very constantly refused, for fear 

 of desertions. These and a variety of other grievances, real or fancied, nearly upset the 

 equilibrium of our entire navy. It is not too much to say that not merely England's 

 naval supremacy was for a time in the greatest jeopardy through the disaffection of the men, 

 but that our national existence, almost and most certainly our existence as a first-class power 

 was alarmingly threatened, the cause being nothing more nor less than a very general 

 spirit of mutiny. To do the sailors justice, they sought at first to obtain fair play by all 

 legitimate means in their power. It must be noted, also, that a large number of our best 

 officers knew that there was very general discontent. Furthermore, it was well known on 

 shore that numerous secret societies opposed to monarchy, and incited by the example of the 

 French Revolution, had been established. Here, again, the Government had made a fatal 

 mistake. Members of these societies had been convicted in numbers, and sent to sea as a 

 punishment. These men almost naturally became ringleaders and paTtakers in the mutiny, 

 which would, however, have occurred sooner or later, under any circumstances. In the case 

 of the mutiny at Spithead, about to be recounted, the sailors exhibited an organisation and 

 an amount of information which might have been expected from " sea-lawyers " rather 

 than ordinary Jack Tars ; while in the more serious rebellion of the Nore, the co-operation 

 of other agents was established beyond doubt. 



The first step taken by the men was perfectly legitimate, and had it been met in a 

 proper spirit by the authorities, this history need never have been penned. At the end of 

 February, 1797, the crews of four line-of-battle ships at Spithead addressed separate petitions 

 to Lord Howe, Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet, asking his kind interposition with 

 the Admiralty, to obtain from them a relief of their grievances, so that they might at 

 length be put on a similar footing to the army and militia, in respect both of their pay and 

 of the provision they might be enabled to make for their wives and families. Lord Howe, 

 being then in bad health, communicated the subject of their petitions to Lord Bridport and 

 Sir Peter Parker, the port admiral, who, with a want of foresight and disregard of their 

 country's interest which cannot be excused, returned answer that "the petitions were the 

 work of some evil-disposed person or persons," and took no trouble to investigate the 

 allegations contained in them. Lord Howe, therefore, did nothing ; and the seamen, 

 finding their applications for redress not only disregarded, but treated with contempt, 

 determined to compel the authorities to give them that relief which they had before 

 submissively asked. 



In about six weeks they organised their plans with such secrecy that it was not til) 



