INSTINCT AND REASON. 397 



position of bone and muscle is essentially the same in both. 

 Both are nourished and poisoned by the same materials ; both 

 have a like relation to cold and heat ; in fact, they have the 

 same relation, in kind, to all the elements and forces of 

 nature. 



If we look for evidence of a supersensuous nature in ani- 

 mals similar to that in man, the evidence is apparently as 

 conclusive as in regard to their likeness of structure. They 

 manifest fear, joy, sorrow, anger and shame. The evidence 

 that these emotions are the same, in kind, as are experienced 

 by man, is seen in the general effect on the physical system 

 and the tones of voice. Fear quickens the beating of the 

 heart and gives trembling to the limbs of a horse as well as 

 to those of a man. The angry dog glares with the eye, emits 

 harsh tones, and is as ready to fight as any brutal man. 



It is impossible to study our domestic animals without a 

 comparison with them of the allied wild races. It is from 

 the wild animal that we learn most readily and fully the scope 

 of its natural powers. 



As a foundation for conscious intelligence we have instinct, 

 a wonderful manifestation, reaching results approved by the 

 intelligence of the wisest man. Of its nature and limitations 

 there is a wide diversity of opinions. 



It is to the consideration of instinct that we shall address 

 ourselves in the remainder of this essay, that we may define 

 terms and prepare the way for the full discussion, another 

 year, of the "Mental Powers of our Domestic Animals." 



Instinct, in popular language, is generally contrasted with 

 Reason. It is spoken of as an entity ; a principle controlling 

 the lower animals and peculiar to them. 



Instinct more properly implies simply a peculiar mode of 

 action, which may prevail in the lower animals or man. It 

 is a name for a class of impulses and capabilities that give 

 rise to actions apparently connected with voluntary powers ; 

 actions for the benefit of the actor, but independent of intelli- 

 gence. Instinctive acts thus simulate intelligent action, while 

 there is no comprehension by the actor of ends, or of means 

 in relation to ends. Such comprehension, wherever found, 

 is the work of Intelligence. But instead of attempting, at 

 the outset, to frame a concise definition of instinct, we shall 



