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THE AIM AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD. 9 



It is clear from this description that an Objcktiv can never 

 exist: it can at best have subsistence. On the other hand, 

 Objekte may either exist, or have subsistence only, according to 

 circumstances. The question whether all non-existent objects 

 have subsistence is one of great difficulty as well as of great 

 importance, but does not concern our present inquiry. It only 

 arises with the consideration of the standing of such objects as 

 the Objektiv of a false judgment, or an impossible Objekt such 

 as the much discussed round square. Meinong denies the 

 subsistence of such objects outside the psychical process whose 

 content they form : (Mr. Russell, on the other hand, asserts the 

 subsistence of all possible objects, but defends himself against 

 the necessity of admitting the subsistence of impossible 

 objects by a theory of denoting which robs them of the 

 character of objectsj By this later development of his doctrine 

 Mr. Russell appears to be able to bring himself into line with 

 common-sense, freeing himself from the necessity of admitting 

 the Being of imaginary entities like Colonel Newcome, or 

 impossibilities like the round square.* Thus he leaves no 

 Objekte except those which I have already described as pre- 

 senting that priority to our thinking which the term Objective 

 (as I have used it) is intended to connote. But Mr. Russell 

 finds himself obliged to maintain the subsistence of all 

 Objektive, whether of true judgments or of falsef even, ap- 

 parently, in the cases where the " subject " of the proposition, 

 in accordance with the theory of denoting, is not an Objekt. 

 Thus, although the round square is not an Objekt, " das 

 Nichtsein des runden Viereckes " is still an Objektiv^ and as- 

 such has subsistence. But subsistence must be granted also to 

 " das Sein des runden Viereckes " ; the only distinction which 

 it is possible to draw between this Objektiv and the former 

 being the (so to speak) external distinction of truth from 



^ * Mind, No. 56, p. 491. 



t Mind, No. 52, pp. 521 et seq. ; No. 56, p. 532. 

 | Ameseder, in Oegenstandstheorie, p. 55. 



