THE AIM AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD. 15 



Such an analysis as this undoubtedly demands a modifica- 

 tion of the ordinary notion of a " thing " in accordance with 

 which all its qualities occupy the same place. Thus, to revert 

 to an example taken from Professor Stout's paper, if I move 

 v. away from the fire I do not suppose that the hotness of the fire 

 changes. At the same time my judgment that " it is not so hot 

 here as there " does (I hold) refer to an Objective hotness which 

 has "priority" to my perception, even if (as is conceivable) I 

 am the only person who could perceive just that hotness at that 

 place and time ; it is a hotness which (in Mr. Moore's words) 

 " exists just as my perception of it exists." We may interpret 

 the " plain man's " implicit recognition that these differences of 

 hotness " have no representative value," do not (that is) imply 

 any changes in the actual " hotness of the fire," not by supposing 

 that the different perceptions are really different perceptions of 

 the same hotness, but that they are different hotnesses which 

 exist at different places around " the fire " that is around the 

 place where the other (chiefly primary) qualities of the fire are 

 to be found and are correlated with the particular hotness which 

 characterises " the fire itself." Upon such a view as this 

 " thing itself " is only the place where some of its qualities exist, 

 while other qualities of the thing may be found throughout the^ 

 region round about this place.* 



6- 



It would be great presumption to hope to do more in a 

 few pages than indicate quite broadly the manner in which 

 the " plain man's " view of the Objectivity of the qualities 

 of things, secondary as well as primary, might be defended 



inspiration and that of Mr. Russell, I had reached the views given above. 

 It is, I suppose, in accordance with precedent that a follower should 

 prove " plus royaliste que le roi," a formula which seems to cover many 

 of my divergencies from Mr. Moore's doctrine. 



* This notion is, of course, not new. See Lotze, Metaphysics, ii, p. 34 ; 

 Ostwald, Vorlesungen uber Natur-philosophie, p. 193. 



