THE AIM AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD. 19 



recognise these difficulties and to remark that though the 

 second and third may make it impossible to apply the concept 

 of Thing quite unambiguously throughout the field of physical 

 existence, yet in the cases in which the " plain man " uses 

 the notion in its primary sense, his confidence that he is 

 applying it to Objective elements of experience is (upon the 

 general view here adopted) abundantly justified. 



A few words may be added upon the question of the 

 perception of a Thing as distinguished from the apprehension 

 of the sensational data upon the basis of which the Thing is 

 " constructed " at the moment of perception. As described by 

 psychologists* the perception of a Thing involves an " acquire- 

 ment of meaning " due to the " complication " of the presented 

 sensational ttata with other objects of the same kind, not at 

 the moment presented. In terms of the explanation given 

 above, the object of the whole psychical state is the complex 

 whole of these past and present sensational data in their 

 Objective relations. The recognition of the Thing is, then, 

 .quite analogous to the recognition of a melody from its 

 opening bars, or of a poem from its opening words with the 

 difference that the whole in the latter cases has Objectivity 

 only in a secondary sense as the actual content of an artist's 

 invention. \ 



But since the objects of the past sensations and a great 

 part of the relational nexus, are not actually presented at 'the 

 moment, " illusions " or misinterpre^itions of the presented 

 data are, possible. 'This fact does not destroy the Objectivity 

 of the Thing, any more than the incorrect identification of a 

 melody from the! opening notes implies want of Objectivity in 

 the melody. The "object of the whole percept is Objective, 

 but it is not the object (it turns out) that ought to have, been 

 presented, but one which, as far as the part immediately 

 presented is concerned, happens to be not easily distinguish- 



* E.g., Stout, Manual of Psychology, 2nd ed., p. 93. 



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