124 THE ADI AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD. 



not inadequately for our purpose, the most systematic of the 

 attempts that have been made to render the whole range of 

 sensible facts intelligible by means of the concepts of " mass " 

 and " motion " which are themselves drawn only from one 

 province of primary facts. While, even if this attempt had 

 been successful,' we should not have felt compelled to admit that 

 the Objectivity of the sensible facts of hotness and coldness 

 had been in any way affected by the discovery of other 

 Objective facts that were found to have a constant relation to 

 them, yet, as a matter of fact, we drew the conclusion that the 

 reduction of the secondary qualities to primary qualities, which 

 is one of the chief motives of this attempt, "has not been 

 effected, and that the failure to effect it has encouraged the 

 development of methods of dealing with Objective facts which 

 respects their Objectivity. Using one of Lotze's pregnant 

 phrases, we have regarded as the goal of this method the 

 employment of correlation of the facts with the members of 

 the number series as a means of analysing and recording the 

 performances of things, so as to detect the manner in which one 

 Keal " takes note " of the behaviour of others with which it has 

 relations. The establishing of these relations, when the primary 

 facts which are the expression of them lie in different provinces, 

 has been most powerfully aided by the concept of Energy, which 

 attributes, in effect, the "quelquc chose qui demeure constant " which 

 is the form which our conviction of relationship inevitably 

 takes,* to the passage of a substance (in the strict philosophical, 

 together with an admixture of the ordinary, sense) from one 

 body to another, where it may appear in a transformed shape. 

 In accordance with our general doctrine, while admitting the 

 psychological usefulness of the concept, and, indeed, insisting 

 upon its psychological necessity, we must refuse to allow 

 writers like Ostwald, against whom we have actually been 

 defending hypotheses, to regard it as the one reality to which 



* Poincare, Science et Hypothese, 1902, p. 153. 



