66 THE PLAY OF ANIMALS. 



instinct and reflex action according as consciousness 

 is present or not. * In the opposite direction, he is 

 more cautious than Ziehen^f who accepts the hypothesis 

 of the absolute unconsciousness of instinctive acts. 

 Ziegler is probably influenced here, as on other points, by 

 Herbert Spencer, who thus guardedly expresses himself: 

 " Instinct in its higher forms is probably accompanied 

 by a rudimentary consciousness." J; So far I agree with 

 Ziegler, but his avoidance of any definite expression of 

 opinion as to whether consciousness is or is not present 

 is significant in another connection, and here, as I think, 

 he is not entirely in the right. Every instinctive act is a 

 means for preserving the species. This fact gives the 

 question of consciousness a double significance, as Hart- 

 mann's definition, for example, clearly shows : " Instinct 

 is the conscious willing of means to an unconsciously 

 willed end." ** 



As concerns the means, that is, the act itself, it 

 is safer, as has been remarked, to avoid the terms 

 '' conscious " and " unconscious " altogether. But it 

 seems permissible to say, at least with reference to the 

 end of a particular action, " by instinct we understand 

 the impulse to an action whose end the individual is 

 unconscious of, but which nevertheless furthers the at- 

 tainment of that end." || That is to say, the conscious- 

 ness of an end as such is entirely separable from the in- 

 stinctive act. Ziegler does not leave room for any psy- 

 chic factor, not even a negative one, in his definition. 



* Romanes, Animal Intelligence, 1892, p. 11. Especially in 

 Schneider's book, Der thierische Wille. 



f Th. Ziehen, Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologic, p. 12. 

 X n. Spencer, Principles of Psychology, p. 105. 



* Hartmann, Philosophic der Fnbewussten, i, p. 76. 

 II Schneider, Der thierische Wille, p. 61. 



