68 THE PLAY OF ANIMALS. 



of clothes he does not reflect that he is thus furthering 

 the preservation of his kind (Schneider). As for the in- 

 stinctive acts of children, savages, and animals, it may 

 safely be affirmed that in them such adaptation of means 

 to the end as selection requires for the preservation of 

 the species is entirely unconscious. At the same time 

 there may very well be consciousness of relative ends. 

 The fox out hunting, for instance, may have a memory 

 of gastronomic enjoyment in his mind as his end idea. 

 I consider this first conception of activity unconscious of 

 its end inadequate, however, because, as has been said, 

 actions not instinctive are also often unaccompanied by 

 a consciousness of their highest or final end. 



Nevertheless, the position to be mentioned as second, 

 combated by Ziegler, seems to me to be nearer the truth, 

 namely, the position that an action is only instinctive 

 when it does not include a consciousness of end, either 

 relative or absolute, as its motive. Let us again take the 

 fox, scenting his prey. If in creeping toward it he has 

 a conscious end, this can only be grounded in in- 

 dividually acquired associations of smell with the agree- 

 able taste of the victim, and in the recollection that it 

 has been known to escape in consequence of careless 

 movements on the part of the pursuer. We can not 

 speak of instinct within the limits of such acquired 

 association, so far as it operates as a motive. So far, 

 on the other hand, as the mere external stimulus to 

 the olfactory nerves of the fox excites to functional 

 activity the hereditary tracts in the animal's brain, so 

 far his act is just as instinctive as the spitting of a kitten 

 at the hand which has stroked a dog, or the bird that 

 builds a nest. Even if the bird does have the conscious- 

 ness that its young will find a warm bed there, its action 

 may still be purely instinctive, so long as that conscious- 



