THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ANIMAL PLAY. 303 



play has none of this aim. Only love play shows some- 

 thing of it, and in this respect it is nearest to art. 



Coming now to inquire into the psychology of the 

 subject yet more closely, we Avill consider two important 

 points: 1. Divided consciousness in make-believe. 2. 

 The feeling of freedom in make-believe. They are 

 closely connected. 



1. Divided Consciousness in Malce-helieve. 



A close examination of this conscious self-illusion, 

 which is the highest psychic phenomenon of play, shows 

 that it is a very peculiar condition of mind. I have de- 

 scribed it briefly in my work on aesthetics: " I know 

 quite well that the waterfall whose motion I am watch- 

 ing does not feel any of the fury that it seems to show, 

 and yet I remain a captive to the thought that this is 

 so. I see through the illusion, and still give myself 

 up to it." * Something of the same idea, too, is con- 

 tained in Schiller's words: " It is self-evident that we 

 are here speaking only of aesthetic appearance (Schein) 

 which we distinguish from reality — and yet not logically 

 so, as when one thing is mistaken for another. We like 

 it because it is show, and not because we mistake it for 

 anything else. In other words, we play with it, and this 

 contrasts it with real deception." f 



It appears, then, that play, when it rises to con- 

 scious self-deception, produces a strange and peculiar 



* Einleitung in die Aesthetik. p. 191. 



f Ueber die aesthetische Erziehung des Menpchen, twenty-sixth 

 letter. See also Kant's weighty utterance : " Xatnre is beautiful 

 when it appears as art; and art can only be called beautiful when 

 we recognise it as art while it yet appears to us as Nature." (Cri- 

 tique of Judgment, § 45). K. Lange has recently revived this con- 

 ception of Kant's. 



