322 THE PLAY OF ANIMALS. 



that is to say, we feel ourselves to be governed entirely 

 by ourselves, by our present will. Xo " not I "" seems 

 to us to influence either our present object or the idea 

 of our former or future experience; we seem to be di- 

 vided from the all-powerful causal nexus pervading the 

 ages, and to be at liberty to fulfil our present desires 

 unencumbered by circumstances or consequences. We 

 seem, as Kant expresses it, to begin a causal series " self- 

 originated and elemental.'^ * 



The feeling of freedom is undoubtedly heightened 

 by our conviction that we can desist from an act at 

 any moment. " I am still free " is the same as " I can 

 yet turn back." Here, also, freedom is identical with 

 being an absolute cause, for if I were able only to set an 

 act on foot, but not go on with it, my freedom would 

 vanish as soon as my causality ceased. So the struggle 

 for liberty turns out to be the highest psychic accom- 

 paniment of the struggle for life. The instinctive pro- 

 pensity of all living creatures to preserve their inde- 

 pendence, to shake off every attempt on individual 

 liberty, culminates in the effort after intellectual lib- 

 erty. The joy of freedom is the sublimest flight of 

 that pleasure in being a cause, which has occupied so 

 much of our attention. 



But where can the feeling of freedom be purer or 

 more intense than in conscious self-illusion in the 

 realm of play? In real life we are always in servitude 

 to objects and under the double weight of past and 

 future. These objects, intelligent and otherwise, for 

 the most part oppose our wills or assume authority 

 over us. Care for the future torments us and robs us 



* Critique of Pure Reason (p. 435 of Kehrbach's German 

 edition). 



