A FRAGMENT ON TRUTH 265 



language by which they are expressed. . The moment we apply 

 these so-called truths to express the complex facts of any real 

 combination, we are met by the discrepancy between theory and 

 practice ; the statements and the facts accord imperfectly. 



Using the word truth in this first sense, the mechanic well 

 knows that absolute truth is unattainable, but he nevertheless 

 values highly the approximation to truth which allows him ap- 

 .proximately to ascertain the result of given simple material com- 

 binations. The knowledge that perfect agreement between the 

 statement and the corresponding fact is impossible by no means 

 leads him to avoid the calculation of the breaking weight of a 

 bridge, or the power required to pump water for the supply of a 

 town. The calculations are imperfect ; the words, or symbols, 

 and the facts do not agree ; it is inconceivable that they should 

 agree ; at most he hopes for the approximate agreement between 

 the conception indicated by the words in his mind and one small 

 part of the resulting facts, but this approximate agreement is of 

 infinite value to mankind, and the mechanic who rejects calcu- 

 lation because of its imperfect accord with fact is ignorant or 

 foolish. 



Coming now to the second conceivable meaning of truth, as 

 signifying an accord between what seems and what is, between 

 conception in our minds and the fact which gives rise to that 

 conception, the very notion of absolute agreement or identity 

 seems preposterous. The impression can not conceivably be 

 identical with the impresser. A dint by a hammer can not be 

 identical with the hammer which produces it. At most one 

 may fit the other, and it is clear that in any such interaction 

 the nature of the impressing or impressed matter greatly in- 

 fluences the perfection of fit. Our perception can never be the 

 thing perceived, and can never correspond even roughly with 

 that thing, except as regards some very limited quality ; as the 

 dint may correspond with a part of the hammer head in respect 

 of form, but in no wise as regards weight, colour, strength, 

 magnetic properties, and so forth. Moreover, the impression 

 even in regard to form will differ widely in different substances ; 

 nay, no two pieces of money, all of one material, all struck from 

 one die, shall be identical. How much less can we expect the 

 impression on several minds, differing far more one from another 



