10 THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY 



subject ail that is in tlie stream of consciousness to 

 conceptual analysis.^ 



That is to say, in thinking about the flux of con- 

 sciousness we decompose it into what we regard as its 

 constituent parts, and we confer upon these parts 

 separate existence in space and time. But it is clear 

 that none of the things which we thus regard as the 

 elements of our consciousness has anv real existence 

 apart from the others. The smell of the flowers and 

 that of the burnt oil interpenetrate in our consciousness 

 of the stimulation of our olfactory organs just as do 

 the jingle of the cab bells, the music of the orchestra, 

 and the throb of the motor car in the impressions 

 transmitted by our auditory organs. It is difflcult 

 to see that all these things, with the multitude of other 

 things which we perceive, constitute a " multiplicity 

 in unity," that is an assemblage of things which are 

 separate things, but which do not lie alongside each 

 other in space and mutually exclude each other, but 

 which are all jammed into each other, so to speak. 

 It is easy to see that we are conscious of a heterogeneity, 

 and whenever we think of this multitude of things 

 it seems natural that we should separate them from 

 each other. The stream of our consciousness is so 

 complex that we cannot attend to it all at once, not 

 even to the few things that we have picked out in 

 our example. If we concentrate our attention on 

 any part, or rather aspect of it, all the rest ceases to 

 exist, or rather we agree to ignore it, and this very 

 concentration of thought upon one part of our experi- 

 ence isolates it from all the rest. To a certain extent 

 the analysis of the complex of sensation is the result 

 of the work of different receptor organs ; certain 



1 All this is, of course, the argument of Bergson's earlier books, Mati^re et 

 Menioire and Donnees immediates de la Conscience. 



