356 LAUGEL'S PROBLEMS OF NATURE AND LIFE. 



the power of forming ' abstract or general ideas.' 

 Taking the simplest view, we may affirm with Cuvier, 

 that the land of reason is virtually the same, however 

 narrow in its scope and combinations. The mute 

 syllogism of the monkey, or the dog, or elephant, is 

 perfect as far as it goes, and might be translated into 

 speech or writing. 1 It is less easy to speak of reflection 

 as a part of their intelligence, and yet this term cannot 

 well be excluded. That they possess and largely employ 

 the memory of objects and events is indisputable, but 

 we have not equal proof as to that more intellectual 

 faculty of recollection the p*vrfp<'r) o-vvOeriKri to 

 which the mind of Man owes so much of its power and 

 attainments. Another question occurs as to their 

 power of forecasting the future. An old English 

 writer speaks of c the boon to animals that they are 

 nescient of evils to come.' Partially this may be true 

 even as to the highest ; but we cannot deny them the 

 simple faculty of anticipating events near at hand, and 

 which come into sequence with others of wonted occur- 

 rence. To these intellectual faculties we may add one 

 more, in the ' sense of humour J so conspicuous in many 

 animals, though not duly noticed in the inference it 

 affords. The gambols and sly artifices of monkeys 

 well depicture the sports and tricks of human child- 

 hood. The dog, toying with his master or gambolling 

 with other dogs, evinces his feeling of fun as plainly as 

 if it were put into words. And reflection will show 

 how much lies beneath this single and simple fact, 



1 Cicero, indeed, speaks of the ' mens, ratio et memoria ' of the ant, 

 qualities which, in this case, as in the bee, we now ascribe to instinct, 

 though not without a certain hesitation where to draw the line. 



