VI IMPULSE AND INSTINCT 301 



Therewith Y. Hartmann evidently partly returns to the 

 mysticism of the Philosophy of the Unconscious, which he is 

 endeavouring in his self-criticism to refute. On the other 

 hand, he comes to consequences according to which all 

 development, all growth, would have to be described as 

 instinct. 



This example shows that we must limit the idea of instinct, 

 and I believe that this is best done in the way I have 

 adopted, namely, by applying the term only to those inherited 

 habits which are so adapted to a purpose that they appear to 

 be due to intelligence or reason. 



V. Hartmann's error of attributing will to the ganglia of 

 the sympathetic nerve system is evidently due to a complete 

 misunderstanding of the functions of the nervous system. 

 Such ganglia are nothing more than the collecting foci of the 

 nerve paths, and at the same time apparatus for the reinforce- 

 ment of the stimuli (accumulators).-^ That their action also 

 depends on acquired and inherited properties, after the preced- 

 ing arguments, does not require to be insisted upon ; but it 

 has never even been under the influence of the will, still less 

 are they capable of originating spontaneous voluntary action. 



In accordance with his view, as above sketched out, V. 

 Hartmann defines instinct as "purposeful action without 

 consciousness of the purpose." 



Impulse and Instinct 



Although we may rightly talk of the instinct of seeking 

 food in higher animals, it is impossible among the lower to 

 establish a limit above which the taking of food is influenced 

 by a choice due to nervous action. In the same way such a 

 limit cannot be established for the commencement of the 

 sexual instinct ; indeed, in my opinion, the commencement of 

 sexual activity depends ultimately on processes of nutrition. 



^ Cf. the next section. 



