Chap. III.] MORAL SENSE. 83 



acquired by man in a very rude state, and probably even 

 by his early ape-like progenitors, still give the impulse to 

 many of his best actions ; but his actions are largely de- 

 termined by the expressed wishes and judgment of his 

 fellow-men, and unfortunately still oftener by his own 

 strong, selfish desires. But as the feelings of love and 

 sympathy and the power of self-command become strength- 

 ened by habit, and as the j)Ower of reasoning becomes 

 clearer so that man can appreciate the justice of the judg- 

 ments of his fellow-men, he will feel himself impelled, in- 

 dependently of any pleasure or pain felt at the moment, 

 to certain lines of conduct. He may then say, I am the 

 supreme judge of my own conduct, and, in the words of 

 Kant, I will not in my own person violate the dignity of 

 humanity. 



The more enduring Social Instincts conquer the less 

 Persistent Itistincts. — We have, however, not as yet con- 

 sidered the main point, on which the whole question of 

 the moral sense hinges. Why should a man feel that he 

 ought to obey one instinctive desire rather than another ? 

 Why does he bitterly regret if he has yielded to the strong 

 sense of self-preservation, and has not risked his life to save 

 that of a fellow-creature ; or why does he regret having 

 stolen food from severe hunger ? 



It is evident in the first place, that with mankind the 

 instinctive impulses have difterent degrees of strength ; a 

 young and timid mother urged by the maternal instinct 

 will, without a moment's hesitation, run the greatest dan- 

 ger for her infant, but not for a mere fellow-creature. 

 Many a man, or even boy, who never before risked his life 

 for another, but in whom courage and sympathy were well 

 developed, has, disregarding the instinct of self-preserva- 

 tion, instantaneously plunged into a torrent to save a 

 drowning fellow-creature. In this case man is impelled 



