Chap. III.] MORAL SENSE. 93 



the welfare of the tribe — not that of the species, nor that 

 of man as an individual member of the tribe. This con- 

 clusion agrees well with the belief that the so-called moral 

 sense is aboriginally derived from the social instincts, for 

 both relate at first exclusively to the community. The 

 chief causes of the low morality of savages, as judged by 

 our standard, are, firstly, the confinement of sympathy to 

 the same tribe. Secondly, insufiicient powers of reasoning, 

 so that the bearing of many virtues, especially of the self- 

 regarding virtues, on the general welfare of the tribe is 

 not recognized. Savages, for instance, fail to trace the 

 multiplied evils consequent on a want of temperance, 

 chastity, etc. And, thirdly, weak power of self-command ; 

 for this power has not been strengthened through long-con- 

 tinued, perhaps inherited, habit, instruction, and religion. 

 I have entered into the above details on the immo- 

 rality of savages,'" because some authors have recently 

 taken a high view of their moral nature, or have attrib- 

 uted most of their crimes to mistaken benevolence." 

 These authors appear to rest their conclusion on savages 

 possessing, as they undoubtedly do possess, and often in a 

 high degree, those virtues which are serviceable, or even 

 necessary, for the existence of a tribal community. 



Concluding MemarJcs. — Philosophers of the derivative ''' 

 school of morals formerly assumed that the foundation of 

 morality lay in a form of Selfishness ; but more recently 

 in the " Greatest Happiness principle." According to the 

 view given above, the moral sense is fundamentally iden- 



'<• See on this subject copious evidence in Cliap. vii. of Sir J. Lub- 

 bock, ' Origin of Civilization,' 1870. 



21 For instance Lecky, 'Hist. European Morals,' vol. i. p. 121. 



8^ This term is used in an able article in the • Westminster Review,' 

 Oct. 1869, p. 49?. For the Greatest Happiness principle, see J. S. Mill, 

 'Utilitarianism,' p. 17. 



