204 



The Review of Reviews. 



THE NEEDS OP^ THE FRENCH 

 NAVY. 



The July Journal of the Royal Untied Service Insti- 

 tulioH publishes a paper by Rear-Admiral Darrieus on 

 the naval problem. The Admiral insists on France 

 securing the fleet of her policy. He is \'ery compli- 

 mentary to this country. He says :— 



Tlio unique and admirable example of England in following 

 her splendid destiny for centuries almost unchecked, no matter 

 who have been her leaders, and in spile of her internal crises, 

 shows us the marvellous results that are achieved by the policy 

 of a people, when that policy is raised to the level of a doctrine. 



The constant experience of history having proved to all 

 Englishmen that the maintenance of the command of the sea 

 was the safeguard of their supremacy, naval power has always 

 been for tliem the supreme object of their policy ; but they have 

 :.ucceedcd, with remarkable facility, in adapting this instrument 

 (o the needs of the moment, in increasing or reducing its 

 strength according to the gravity of the danger, or the 

 threatened attack of .coalitions. They have contrived, more- 

 over, to vary the direction of their energies so as to suit the 

 prevailing circumstances. 



GERMANY THE MOST LIKELY ENEMY. 



Iiifjuiring what is the policy of France, he takes the 

 German Empire as the most likely enemy, and observes 

 in passing, of the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine, it is the 

 conquests alone that have always brought about the 

 downfall of the conquerors. 



In the event of a conflict with Germany, would 

 France stand alone ? Would Germany stand alone ? 

 He says ; — 



The urgent need of strategy is for concrete realities, andjt 

 remains powerless before the sudden and disconcerting shifts of 

 the wind which have too often characterised the "foreign 

 affairs" of our country. Here, again, the genius of England 

 lias always been able to find the happy solution in good time, 

 the best alliance against the adversary of the moment, even 

 though the ally of to-day may have been the enemy of yesterday. 



ALLIANCES TEMPORARY. 



The Admiral goes on to urge that alliances and 

 ententes arc apt to dissolve with the interests which 

 brought them about, and :^ 



It may be accepted then that the possibility of a single- 

 handed struggle with Germany should serve as a basis for the 

 study of the naval problem. It is all the more legitimate to 

 accept these premises when it is remembered that every coalition 

 is answered by a hostile one \\ hich seeks naturally to restore 

 the balance of power : to the Triple Alliance is opposed the 

 Triple Entente, ami vice versn. 



Erom whatever point of view we look at the question, the 

 fleet of French policy is, then, the fleet which will enable that 

 policy to fight the German Navy on equal terms. .Such a fleet 

 alone will be able to contest command of the sea with its 

 adversary, and, by securing it, to guirantee to the French 

 armies full liberty of action in the Vosges. 



He remarks that if Russia had spent forty millions 

 in securing a fleet superior to Japttn. it might have 

 obviated the defeat of the Russians, which in\olved 

 bi.\ or scNcn times as great an expenditure. 



THE At;STRO-ITALIAN FLEET. 



The Admiral, while complimenting Germany on the 

 rapid rise of her fleet, laments that France did not keep 

 pace with her. He goes on to calculate that if the 

 Austro-ltalian navy cannot by itself be regarded as a 



dangerous force, yet as a possible addition of strength 

 to an enemy it must be watched. In the Mediterranean 

 the position would be thus : — " The forces mustering 

 in the ' French lake ' would be actually ten Dread- 

 noughts and twelve second-line battleships on the side 

 of the Austro-ltalian coalition, and four Dreadnoughts, 

 eleven second-line ships, and seven armoured cruisers 

 for France." 



THREE BATTLESHIPS A YEAR. 



'J'he ultimate aim of the French Navy should be the 

 creation of a counterpoise to the German Navy. This 

 would be the true conception of naval policy : — 



If the principle of having six ' squadrons as at present is 

 maintained, the real naval programme then assumes the form 

 of a periodical replacement of eacli of these homogeneous naval 

 forces, beginning of course with the most antiquated— fust the 

 I^othitaus, then the Saint Louis^ thirdly the Condcs^ etc. 



Adopting a maximum age of twenty years for the units, it 

 will be seen that by igao three of these divisions should have dis- 

 appeared, to make room for others composed of modern ships ; 

 this effort means the construction of twenty-seven battleships, 

 or, deducting the_/tv;« Bart, Courbct, France, and Paris, which 

 are already launched or laid down, twenty-three ships only. 

 Reckoning three years for construction and completion (and it 

 only needs a little determination in order to do this) a programme 

 of this nature w^ould require the laying-dow n regularly of three 

 battleships a year. Is such an eff ut really beyond the resources 

 of France ? In order to answer this question it is only neces- 

 sary to have studied the marvellous vitality of this country 

 throughout her history, and more especially to have felt its 

 ]iulsations in times of difliculty. 



GUNS AND RANGE. 



The Admiral thinks that the 305mm. (t^in.) projectile 

 is amply sufficient to produce at 8,750 to 10,950 yards 

 range the necessary effects to put any modern ship 

 out of action. The adoption of a higher calibre would, 

 he thinks, be a mistake. The present fighting range of 

 10,950 yards is very near the maximum limit, which is 

 12,000 yards, the mean distance of the horizon, beyond 

 which an enemy's ship begins to disappear from sight. 



THE SQUADRON THE UNIT. 



The Admiral regrets the omission of the scout, 

 a swift ship of from 3,000 to 5,000 tons. He further 

 urges : — 



The unit of force is not the ship of the line, but tlie sauaJron, 

 composed of the line of battle and the light cruiser division. 

 Consequently the fleet should be reconstructed squadron for 

 squadron, and not ship for ship ; considerations of homogeneity 

 (as complete as possible), ;vrmament, speed, matioeuvring quali- 

 ties, seagoing endurance, etc., which must never be lo.-t sight 

 of, render this an imperative obligation. 



The ;\dmiral then goes on to insist on the mobili>.i 

 lion being permanent, and its concentration at a few 

 judiciously selected strategic points, and holds that the 

 present concentration of the main forces of France in 

 the Mediterranean incets the requirements, of her 

 present policy. 



" l^NC.Lisii as She is Japped " is noticed in the 

 Oriental Review for July. " VV. F.," writing to the New- 

 York Sun from London, reports this delicious bit : — 

 " I saw recently in the Far East on a baker's shop ; 

 ' A. Karimura, Biggest Loafer in Tokio.' " 



