Leading Articles in the Reviews. 



207 



OUR MEDITKRRANEAX LAND 

 FORCES. 



The military aspeit of the surrender of the Mediter- 

 ranean is the subject of a study in the Fortnightly 

 Review by Captain Cecil Battine. He says :— 



The local interests of the Biilish Empire in the waters of the 

 Mediterranean are unquestionably of the gravest kind — not only 

 on account of the immense and increasing Eastern trade which 

 reaches our [.oris through the ^ucz Canal, but also because of 

 our dependence on imported corn, and particularly upon the 

 import of strain from India and Southern Russia. It might 

 well be argued that so long .as this necessity exists we may not 

 venture to risk even a temporary inferiority of naval power on 

 the sea-route which connects Gibraltar and Malta with Port 

 -Said and the Dardanelles. Political reasons, too, of great 

 weight demand the presence of a powerful British squadron in 

 ihe Near East. 



The writer laments that all the pick of our soldiers 

 and our officers are sent out to the army in India. 

 The rank and file of the Indian army are professional 

 soldiers in the most thorough sense. This mighty force 

 might be organised so as to become available for the 

 expeditionary army, and not merely tied down to the 

 local defence of India. 



AN INDI.\N .ARMY I.V EGYPT. 



It is futile hardihood to deny to Indian troops the 

 right to share in the general defence of the Empire : — 



If our War .\dministration were in capable hands Egypt 

 would soon become a potertlial base for an Indian .Vrmy of at 

 least three divisions of cavalry with four divisions of infantry. 

 It is not necessary to point out how the concentration of such 

 an army in Egypt would aBect the policy of Turkey and other 

 Balkan .States in the event of a general war, nor yet the 

 influence it would exert over the councils of Italy. A success- 

 ful invasion of North-Eastern France by the German armies 

 might well be brought to a standstill by reinforcing the French 

 armies on Ihe Rhone and Loire with such a powerful contingent 

 of veteran soldiers. Lastly, Ihe existence of a powerful army 

 in Egypt, or based on Egypt, would exert a tremendous 

 influence in keeping open the trade routes by which we import 

 our food supply. 



Tilt MlDIil.K TERM BETWEEN INDIA AND BRITAIN. 



It is evident then that while the principal centres of possible 

 disturbance which might involi'c Britain in a life-and-death 

 struggle lie as far apart as the North Sea and the Levant, the 

 land lorces of the British Empire are located in two groups, the 

 most powerful of which keeps ward over the Indian Peninsula, 

 while the connecting link is formed by the fortresses, garrisons, 

 and naval >quadfon of Britain in the .Metlilerrancan. This fact 

 alone emph.isiscs the importance of the policy and strategy upon 

 which our rulers may decide in respect of the situation in that 

 pari of the world. The course of events, loo, points to Ihe 

 shores of the Mediterranean as likely once more to furnish the 

 ostensible pretext, if not the real cause, of a quarrel which 

 must divide Europe into hostile camps. 



The writer goes on to enforce his favourite plea that 

 our rulers must be converted to the doctrine of sym- 

 metrical sea and land power. 



IRtiENCV ONLY FDR A SIK)RT TIMK. 



He thus treats of the Imperial significance of 

 Canada : — 



The division of our main land forces into two groups con- 

 nected by the sea rr>ulc of the Mediterranean is for us an 

 unavoidable drawback, but time is building up a third and 

 more poncrful seat of empire than either in Canada, whence 

 boundless supplies of food can be imported into Britain. It is 



only necessary for the British nation to hold the pass ibr a com- 

 paratively short lime ; but foreigners are more alive to the fact 

 than our own people, and knowing that *' time is the essence of 

 the contract," may force on an early decision. The latent and 

 potential military power, both of England and India, is immense. 

 The maintenance of the connecting link between England 

 and India, between our two armies in being, between the dense 

 populations of our industrial centres and the broad lands where 

 grows their corn, depends on the naval strength we can afford 

 10 detach to the Mediterranean after providing for the situation 

 in the .\orth Sea. 



Though severely disparaging the work of Lord 

 Haldane at the War Office, the writer rejoices in the 

 military capacity of Mr. Churchill and of Colonel Seely. 



Dr. Dillon, in the Contemporary, says that the with- 

 drawal of British battleships from the Mediterranean 

 would mark an epoch of manifest decline in British 

 history. He shrewdly says no Power will nowadays face 

 a war merely for the sake of keeping faith with its allies. 

 Partial abandonment of the Mediterranean, through 

 which comes a body of British trade valued at 

 £200,000,000 a year, furnished Russian diplomacy with 

 the first motive for raising the question of the Straits. 

 It argued that as French Dreadnoughts there would be 

 outweighed by Italy and .\ustria, it would be to Great 

 Britain's advantage that Russia should have a strong 

 Black Sea squadron able to pass freely in and out of 

 the Mediterranean : — 



British supremacy at sea is a matter of life and death to the 

 Empire. No price is too high, no financial sacrifice too heavy, 

 to maintain it. Optimism in underrating the dangers that 

 menace it, trustfulness in reckoning upon the active help of 

 foreign States and care for economy in providing ships, men, or 

 armaments, are among the most insidious enemies ol that 

 supremacy on the maintenance of which the existence ol the 

 Empire is dependent. ■ 



THE FALL OF SHEFKET PASHA. 



Dr. Dili.o.n, in the Contetiiporary Review for .\ugust, 

 says that the army is still the arbiter of Voung Turkey's 

 destinies, and that Mahmoud Shefket withdrew 

 because of the overwhelming opposition he encountered 

 among the Arabs :— 



The new army which Mahmoud Shefket had worked so hard 

 to reorganise and build up — his own cherished creation— turned 

 against him. It is a tragic fate that reminds one of that of 

 Sejanus. Eor some lime past I had noticed the growing cold- 

 ness of the officers towards their chief, then their sharp criticism, 

 and at last their vehement opposition. The motives were 

 many. Some held him responsible for withdrawing troops from 

 Tripoli shortly before the war. Others blamed him severely 

 for his loyalty to the ex-Grand Vizier, Ilakki Pasha, who was 

 circumvented by the Ilali.ans, and against whom an indictment 

 is now being lilcd. Others hated him for having so long 

 covered with his person the Salonica Committee, and per- 

 petuated a system of government which they deem responsible 

 for most of the tribulations of Voung Turkey. The draconic 

 bill lately brought in by Mahmoud Shefket prohibiting army 

 officers and men from taking part in political manifestations, 

 societies, etc., also entere<l inlo the nioiivcs of a section of his 

 adversaries. To most liritons that would seem an excellent 

 measure. And in Turkey it was a veritable necessity. 



And now he is gone— sacrificed, one might Siiy, by the very 

 men whom he had kept so long alxjve water. They offereil 

 him up as an expiatory sacrifice 10 the Pretorian guards io ibc 

 hope of saving their parly and ihcir country. 



