*% THE SUGAK INDUSTRY. 



would receive $80,000,000 for this new crop. That is to say, this money would go into 

 our farmers' pockets each year instead of being sent out of the country to pay for 

 imported sugars. 



Each factory would cost about' $350,000, or over $300,000,000 for the 920 factories 

 needed to make our own sugar. The cost of labor and materials for running each fac- 

 tory, aside from beets, would be about $500 a day during the campaign, or $50,000 for 

 the season. Thus the annual distribution for labor and materials would approximate 

 $45,000,000! 



Each of these 900 or more sugar mills means the distribution every year in the 

 immediate community of the following amounts: 



For beets, 30,000 to 50,000 tons $150,000 to $200,000 



Factory labor and supplies 50,000 to 75,000 



Repairs, salaries, etc 10,000 to 25,000 



Profits and reserves 25,000 to 75,000 



Total $235,000 to $375,000 



It is safe to calculate on a yearly turn-over by each factory equal in amount to its 

 capital, under average conditions. This is even more true of the larger sugar factories. 

 It is proving true of the mammoth concerns that are growing up in California, each 

 representing an investment of from $1,000,000 to nearly $3,000,000. Indeed farmers will 

 be paid $2,500,000 or more each year for the beets needed to supply only the two mills 

 at Watsonville and Salinas in that state. 



CONGRESS RECOGNIZED THE GREAT POSSIBILITIES 



of the domestic sugar industry and in the Dingley tariff of July 24,1897, endeavored to 

 provide suitable protection to both producers and refiners. That tariff was not secured 

 until after a bitter fight, in which the American farmer for the first time came to the 

 front and demanded that the sugar schedule should be framed in the interests of the 

 domestic grower of sugar beets and sugar cane, instead of being framed to specially 

 protect the refiner of imported raw sugars. 



The Dingley tariff is serving its purpose well. Owing to large imports before it 

 went into effect, its operation for the fiscal year 1898 is only indicative of what may be 

 expected from the present sugar schedule if it continues to be fairly enforced against 

 all sugars. 



Certain friends of the American Sugar Refining Company, or sugar trust, claimed the 

 new law was especially favorable to that concern even after the House had compelled the 

 Senate to recede from the Senate schedule that did foster the refiners at the expense of 

 domestic producers. On the strength of this claim, the shares of the trust were "boomed" 

 from around par to nearly 150. But in spite of the profits on imports at lower duties 

 prior to July, 1897, the new law did not specially benefit the trust and its shares collapsed 

 again. Indeed the imports of refined sugar under the Dingley tariff have been unex- 

 pectedly large. 



Imports of raw sugar from Europe have almost ceased, owing to the higher tariff 

 and the countervailing duties equal to European export bounties. Indeed only 158 mil- 

 lion pounds of raw sugar were imported from Europe in 1898, compared to 1,899 million 

 pounds in '97. Contrast this decrease of twelve-fold in one year with the increase of five- 

 fold in Europe's sugar exports to the United States in '96 over '95! 



Imports from the countries to the south of us also show a decline, largely owing 

 to the continued curtailment of production in Cuba caused by the war. 



