x THE PLAY OF ANIMALS. 



comes up as to which of these forms is primary; again 

 the old problem as to whether intelligence arose out of 

 reflexes or the reverse. 



I think some light falls on this time-honoured prob- 

 lem from the statement of it in connection with this 

 new question of play ; especially when we remember Herr 

 Groos' theory of the function of imitation with the ex- 

 tension of his view suggested above. If imitation stands 

 midway between instinct and intelligence, both further- 

 ing the growth of instinct in some cases, and also, in 

 other cases, leading to its decay in the presence of intel- 

 ligence, then we might hold something like this : In pro- 

 portion as an action loses its consciously imitative and 

 volitional character, to that degree it tends to be in- 

 capable of u make-believe " exercise, becoming real in 

 consciousness and instinctive in performance (and this 

 applies to the cases in which imitation has itself become 

 habitual and instinctive, as in the mocking-bird) ; and 

 on the contrary, in proportion as an instinctive action 

 is modified and adapted through imitation and intelli- 

 gence, to that degree it becomes capable of assuming 

 the " make-believe " character and is indulged in as con- 

 scious play. I can not enlarge upon this here, but it 

 seems to square with a good many of the facts; both 

 with those which Professor Groos cites as showing that 

 imitation opens the way for the decay of instinct with 

 the growth of intelligence, and with those which Pro- 

 fessor Lloyd Morgan and I have cited as showing that 

 imitation keeps congenital variations alive and so allows 

 them to accumulate into instincts. It is also consistent 

 with the view that imitation is a sort of meeting point 

 of race habit, represented by instinct, and race accom- 

 modation, represented by intelligence: just the double 

 function which imitation serves also in the development 



