28 THE PLAY OF ANIMALS. 



Brehm mentions a professor of zoology * by whom 

 the old theory of instinct was set forth in its crude dual- 

 istic form — which was at that time combated most ener- 

 getically by the opposers of the word instinct — i. e., that 

 animals have only instinct and i no reasoning powers, 

 while man has reasoning powers and no instinct. " We 

 know well/' says this zoologist, " that a being capable of 

 adapting means to his ends must be a reflecting, reason- 

 ing being, and that in this world man is the only such be- 

 ing. An animal does not think, does not reason, nor set 

 itself aims, and therefore, if it acts intelligently, some 

 other being must have thought for it. A higher law pro- 

 vides the ways and means of its defence. The acts of 

 men alone are governed by their own reason. Deep 

 thought is doubtless disclosed in the actions of animals, 

 but the animals did not think them any more than does a 

 machine whose work represents an embodied chain of 

 reasoning. The bird sings entirely without his own co- 

 operation; he must sing when the time comes, and he 

 can not do otherwise, nor can he sing at any other time. 

 The bird fights because fight he must by order of a 

 higher power. The fact is evident that the animal does 

 not consciously fight for any special thing, such as the 

 undisturbed possession of the female, nor seek by his 

 struggles and effort to attain it. He acts as a mere crea- 

 ture of Nature under her stringent laws. It is not the 

 animal that acts, for he is impelled by a higher power 

 to altogether fixed courses of conduct. Parent birds 

 can not deviate from a certain fixed method of rearing 

 their young; both must work and help in the process; 

 a command from above compels them to stay and work 



* V. B. Altum, Der Vogel und sein Leben, Munster, 1875, fifth 

 edition, p. 6 f., 114, 126 ; 13 f., 138, 141. 



