40 THE PLAY OF ANIMALS. 



self at least, I must own that I can no longer do it " * 

 (§ 138). 

 ts* It would hardly be necessary to cite further exam- 



ples of inherited instinct f if the principle involved were 

 not so vital to my purpose. As this is so, I give the views 

 of two modern philosophers who both defend the idea 

 of instinct, though from very different standpoints and 

 without being in any special sense Darwinians. 



E. von Hartmann gives the following among a great 

 many other examples: " Caterpillars of the Saturnia 

 pavonia minor eat the leaves of a shrub as soon as they 

 emerge from the egg, go underneath the leaves when it 

 rains, and change their skin from time to time; this is 

 their whole existence, and in it not the least evidence 

 of intelligence can be found. But the time comes for 

 spinning their cocoon, and they build it firm and strong, 

 with a double arch formed by gathering the fibres to- 

 gether at the top, so that they are very easy, to open 

 from the inside, but offer considerable resistance to any 

 external force. Were this arrangement the result of 

 conscious intelligence, a chain of reasoning something 

 like this would be necessary: f I am now approaching 

 a chrysalis state, and, immovable as I am, I shall be 

 exposed to attack; therefore I will inclose myself in a 

 cocoon. Since I shall not be in a condition as a butter- 

 fly to effect an exit either through mechanical or through 

 chemical means, as many other caterpillars do, I must 

 therefore provide an opening. But at the same time, 



* It may be mentioned that even the sceptic David Hume called 

 instinct a primary gift of Nature, a degree of capability that ordi- 

 narily surpasses the animal's powers and can not be much bettered 

 by the longest practice or use. An Inquiry concerning the Human 

 Understanding, p. 99. 



f See also A. and K. Miiller, Wohnungen, Leben und Eigen- 

 thumlichkeit in der hoheren Thierwelt, p. 8 f. 



