THE PLAY OF ANIMALS. 223 



would appear that the animal, though aware of the 

 stimulation to external imitation from optical and acous- 

 tic impressions, is able to hold it in check so that an 

 internal excitation alone is produced by the imitative 

 impulse, whose reflex in consciousness consists of " feel- 

 ings of imitation." In order to illustrate my concep- 

 tion of the origin of such aesthetic feeling I venture to 

 cite a progressive series of examples from human life. 

 A boy on the streets sees some other boys chasing a 

 comrade in play; he looks on for a few seconds, his 

 interest constantly increasing, until he joins the pur- 

 suers. These few seconds of observation I regard as the 

 primary form of aesthetic perception directed toward 

 the movements that incite his impulse of imitation, 

 for there is an inner imitation as an antecedent or 

 point of departure for the outer. A boy takes part in 

 a game involving complicated movements. He is taken 

 prisoner by the opposing party and must stand in a base 

 until one of his own side frees him. Esthetic percep- 

 tion is manifest in the absorbed attention with which 

 he enters into all the movements of his companions, 

 for, while his impulse to external imitation is so far 

 arrested by the laws of the game that it can not attain 

 its object at once, this result follows as soon as the boy 

 is at liberty to move from the base. — Suppose some 

 witnesses of a race. Here the impulse to active imita- 

 tion does not tend to external discharge. No one tries 

 to leave his seat, but contents himself with expressing 

 the feelings produced by internal imitation of the vary- 

 ing operations. Here we have the simplest and most 

 primary form of pure aesthetic perception. — We are sit- 

 ting in the theatre, the simulated actions and tones of 

 voice are only the means of appealing to our sympathy 

 and placing us mentally in touch with what is being 



