THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ANIMAL PLAY. 305 



into activity. We know, further, that human con- 

 sciousness does not reveal all its store at once, for the 

 mental field of vision is like the optical, in that a part 

 of our store of knowledge is pre-eminent, while all the 

 rest is grouped about the mental view-point (Wundt). 

 I have called this the " monarchical character of con- 

 sciousness." * But it seems in general, if not always, 

 that the psychic fringe outside of the mental view- 

 point has a certain independence. If we figure the 

 former as a peak, the latter will form neighbouring 

 hills. But how do they arise? In normal cases they 

 are formed from the debris of former intellectual opera- 

 tions, which may have been insignificant as psychic 

 phenomena, but are important by reason of their close 

 connection with habits that have become reflex from 

 constant repetition. Thus, when our consciousness be- 

 comes full of ideas that are only loosely connected with 

 our habitual I,f it too becomes a neighbouring peak, J 

 and so a simple and normal division of consciousness is 

 effected. Condillac recognised this fact and expressed 

 it with the greatest clearness. He says: " When a ge- 

 ometer is intensely occupied with the solution of a prob- 

 lem, external objects continue to act on his senses and 

 the habitual I responds to their impressions. It walks 

 him about Paris, avoiding obstacles while the reflective 

 I is entirely absorbed in the solution." * 



* Einleitutig in die Aesthetik, p. 3. 



f I use the terms " habitual I," " real I," and " apparent I " 

 without the intention of implying actual plurality of personality. 



\ Herein appears also the biological utility of the normal di- 

 vision of consciousness, namely, in that higher intellectual devel- 

 opment would be impossible without relative independence of the 

 habitual I. 



* E. Alix, L'esprit de nos betes, p. 587. 



