THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ANIMAL PLAY. 313 



Still more remarkable are Binet's observations of 

 hysteria with partial anaesthesia.* For example, the 

 right hand is wholly without sensation, but only so for 

 the waking consciousness, for it grasps a pencil without 

 the patient's seeing or knowing it, finishes a sentence, 

 and even corrects an error intentionally made by the 

 experimenter. There must, then, be a consciousness 

 for which the hand is not anaesthetic. 



Many of Binefs experiments indicate that here, too, 

 an unconscious connection exists between the two states 

 of consciousness; hysterical patients may have visual 

 images corresponding to impressions made on the sub- 

 liminal consciousness. " If, for example, some familiar 

 object, like a knife, is brought into contact with a 

 hand without sensation, the person knows nothing 

 about the form of the knife, about pain inflicted, etc., 

 but all these latent sensations produce their optical coun- 

 terpart in the sphere of the first consciousness — namely, 

 the visual image of a knife."' f 



We can attain our object sooner by turning now to 

 E. von Hartmann's Aesthetics. I have already referred 

 to his doctrine that the make-believe ego derives aesthetic 

 satisfaction from pretence, while the real ego stands 

 quietly in the background. But besides these apparent 

 feelings we have also real feelings, while we enjoy aes- 

 thetic pleasure — namely, our real delight in the appar- 

 ent. % This real pleasure that belongs, as such, to the 

 obscured real ego, now comes over into the sphere of the 



* Binet, Alterations of Personality. 



f M. Dessoir, Das Doppel-Ich, p. 11. 



X Von Hartmann, Aesthetik, vol. ii, p. 64. The distinction be- 

 tween make-believe and real feelings is well illustrated by our en- 

 joyment of tragedy, where an unpleasant sham feeling gives real 

 pleasure — namely, aesthetic satisfaction. 



