376 GENERAL SUMMARY [Part II. 



and, as liappincss is an essential part of the general good, 

 the greatest-happiness principle indirectly serves as a 

 nearly safe standard of right and wrong. As the reason- 

 ing powers advance and experience is gained, the more 

 remote effects of certain lines of conduct on the character 

 of the individual, and on the general good, are perceived; 

 and then the self-regarding virtues, from coming within 

 the scope of public opinion, receive praise, and their 

 opposites receive blame. But with the less civilized 

 nations reason often errs, and many bad customs and base 

 superstitions come within the same scope, and consequent- 

 ly are esteemed as high virtues, and their breach as heavy 

 crimes. 



The moral fticulties are generally esteemed, and with 

 justice, as of higher value than the intellectual powers. 

 But we should always bear in mind that the activity of 

 the mind in vividly recalling past impressions is one of 

 the fundamental though secondary bases of conscience. 

 This fact affords the strongest argument for educating 

 and stimulating in all possible ways the intellectual fac- 

 ulties of every human being. No doubt a man with a 

 torpid mind, if his social affections and sympathies are 

 well developed, will be led to good actions, and may have 

 a fairly sensitive conscience. But whatever renders the 

 imagination of men more vivid and strengthens the habit 

 of recalling and comparing jiast impressions, will make 

 the conscience more sensitive, and may even compensate 

 to a certain extent for weak social affections and sym- 

 pathies. 



The moral nature of man has reached the highest 

 standard as yet .attained, partly through the advance- 

 ment of the reasoning powers and consequently of a just 

 ])ublic opinion, but especially through the sympathies 

 being rendered more tender and widely diffused tlirough 

 the effects of habit, example, instruction, and reflection. 



