ON THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF LIFE 109 



propositions are distinctly materialistic. Nevertheless two 

 things are certain; the one, that I hold the statements to be 

 substantially true; the other, that I, individually, am no 

 materialist, but, on the contrary, believe materialism to 

 involve grave philosophical error. 



This union of materialistic terminology with the repu- 

 diation of materialistic philosophy I share with some of the 

 most thoughtful men with whom I am acquainted. And, 

 when I first undertook to deliver the present discourse, it 

 appeared to me to be a fitting opportunity to explain how 

 such a union is not only consistent with, but necessitated 

 by, sound logic. I purposed to lead you through the terri- 

 tory of vital phenomena to the materialistic slough in which 

 you find yourselves now plunged, and then to point out to you 

 the sole path by which, in my judgment, extrication is possible. 



Let us suppose that knowledge is absolute, and not rel- 

 ative, and therefore, that our conception of matter represents 

 that which it really is. Let us suppose, further, that we do 

 know more of cause and eft'ect than a certain definite order 

 of succession among facts, and that we have a knowledge of 

 the necessity of that succession — and hence, of necessary laws 

 — ^and I, for my part, do not see what escape there is from 

 utter materialism and necessarianism. For it is obvious 

 that our knowledge of what we call the material world is, 

 to begin with, at least as certain and definite as that of the 

 spiritual world, and that our acquaintance with law is of as 

 old a date as our knowledge of spontaneity. Further, I take 

 it to be demonstrable that it is utterly impossible to prove that 

 anything whatever may not be the effect of a material and 

 necessary cause, and that human logic is equally incompe- 

 tent to prove that any act is really spontaneous. A really 

 spontaneous act is one which, by the assumption, has no 



