224 ■^'''^ '^^^• 



have issued through long intermediate series, and 

 the sum of their analogies and differences repre- 

 sents their greater or less remoteness from each 

 other and from the common source. From rela- 

 tively few primordial types, Nature has given birth 

 to all the organisms which people the globe. He 

 quite literally follows Lamarck's conception of filia- 

 tion as a branching system, but he widely departs 

 from Lamarck as to the causes of Evolution. With 

 Goethe, he sees in living organisms a 'plasticity^ 

 which renders them susceptible to direct modifica- 

 tioii by environment and opposes the conservative 

 power of Atavism, or hereditary transmission of 

 tvpe. As with Bory de St. Vincent, he believes 

 that the younger primitive types presented greater 

 ' plasticity,' but with advancing ages the forces of 

 heredity accumulated and became stronger. 



Behind that ' plasticity ' and ' Atavism,' however, 

 Naudin places a higher power, — ' Finality, ' — a 

 mysterious force, which, he says, some would call 

 ' fatality ' and others ' providence,' the continuous 

 action of which upon beings determines the form, 

 size, and duration of each species in relation to the 

 order of things of which it forms a part. The 

 natural species is a product, then, of Atavism and 

 of Finality. By Finality, Naudin evidently does not 

 imply an internal perfecting tendency in Nature, 

 but rather a continuous controlling principle above 

 the reign of secondary causes. Naudin evidently 

 felt the need of something behind Natural Law in 



