250 EiJohttivii of 77iei)/(>(///. 



atlieism, which is not only tlie negation of 3'eligion, but also- 

 of philosophy. Of Agnosticism and Positivism I have not 

 spoken. Agnosticism is simply an attitude of the mind 

 towards all theological speculation, and refuses to enter upon 

 it, claiming all such questions to be insoluble from the 

 nature of the case. Positivism on the theistic side is also 

 agnostic, and therefore devotes itself exclusively to the 

 amelioration of the social order. These, therefore, yield 

 nothing to the history of theism in the way of constructive 

 thought. 



It is not claimed, and could not be, that religious history 

 shows, in any part of the world, a consecutive development 

 of all these successive phases of theistic belief. In every 

 nation, some one of them has been mostly predominant. 

 Pantheistic and similar views have been the outcome of 

 individual speculation, at least in later times, and have arisen 

 from the philosophical schools. The tendency of the general 

 movement, however, wdierever there has been movement, is 

 along the same lines as in scientific thought, viz., from nar- 

 rower to wider generalization. This is characteristic of it as 

 a whole, — following, thereby, the natural order of the Evolu- 

 tion of Mind, and, so far as it does so, or is allowed freely 

 to do so, progressing from the lower to the higher ideals 

 according to the true law of development.* 



*It is manifestly impossible to do moi'e than suggest the position of the l)oc- 

 trine of the AbsoUite, in its relation to prior views. The object is only to show 

 how it stands rt'latt'd to jiri'vious ]iIiil()S()i)hies as the ultimatt' and necessarily 

 final ixcncralizatiiin. ^\l■^ll(luld untv, however, that while .Mr. Spencer accepts 

 the CDnclusion aliove (Hinted Irom J )r. .Mansel, as a hi'iical cduseipience of his 

 premises, he asserts, nevertheless, the valid existence of what he terms an 

 ^^ iiiih'fiiiitr co/i.'icidiisiicss" of the Absolute, wlucli, as entering- necessarily in 

 all coiitenii)lation of the Absolute, is an ineradicable f'a<'tor therein, and that 

 this is the suthcient basis for all essentially religious ideas, whereby in fact all 

 tliat there is essentially religious in all phases of theistic belief has been pre- 

 served. 



Furtlier discussion here is impossible. The reader must be referred to Mr. 

 Spencer's "First l'rincii)les." An interesting and thoiightfiU critiiiue uiion 

 Mr. Spencer's views as to this "indefinite consciousness" considered in reler- 

 ence to, and in comparison with, his doctrine of the relativity of ideas, will be 

 found in the first ]iart of I'rof. .bjhn Caird's "Philosophy of Rehgion." Mr. 

 Spencer contends that his doctrine of the Absolute is not a negation ; that it 

 is the highest ])ossilile afiirniation. It is a i>lenuni, and not a vat'unin. It is 

 perha])s somewhat unfortunate tliat he should have entitled the tirst jiart of the 

 First rrinciiiles, "The Inkiiowable," thus giving oei-asion for nmch useless 

 and worthless criticism of the Synthetic I'liilosopliy as essentially destructive 

 and not i-onstru(-tive. "'I'lic .\lisolutc is luknowablc," is the idea therein 

 presented, although the wortls are used more or less interchangeably. 



