BH. XIV.] LIFE AND MIND. 79 



factors is not the chief, hut a suhordinate, suhject of inquiry. 

 Digestion, for instance, implies food ; and " food implies 

 neighbouring plants or animals ; but this implication scarcely 

 enters into our study of digestion, unless we ask the quite 

 special question — how the digestive organs become fitted to 

 the materials they have to act upon." But a moment's intro- 

 spection will make it clear to everyone, "that he cannot 

 frame any psychological conception without looking at in- 

 ternal coexistences and sequences in their adjustments to ex- 

 ternal coexistences and sequences. If he studies the simplest 

 act of perception, as that of localizing a touch in some part 

 of his skin, the indispensable terms of his inquiry are : — on 

 the one hand a thing (1) and a position (2), both of which he 

 regards as objective ; and on the other hand a sensation (3), 

 and a state of consciousness constituting his apprehension of 

 position (4), both of which he regards as subjective. Or, if 

 he takes for his problem one of his complex sentiments, as 

 that of justice, he cannot represent to himself this sentiment, 

 or give any meaning to its name, without calling to mind 

 actions and relations supposed to exist in the environment : 

 neither this nor any other emotion can be aroused in con- 

 sciousness even vaguely, without positing something beyond 

 consciousness to which it refers."^ 



Let us observe, in passing, that these considerations are 

 quite incompatible with Materialism. The doctrine of the 

 materialists rests partly on the assumption that the study of 

 the laws of nervous action can give us a complete account of 

 mental phenomena. But we have seen that to understand 

 the simplest act of perception, we must take into the account 

 .-ot only the subjective and the objective factors, but the 

 relation between the two. It is this relation which consti- 

 tutes the perception. But this relation exists only in con- 

 sciousness, and we cannot explain it save by direct observation 

 Df consciousness. Push our researches in biology as far as 

 ' Spencer, Frinci^les of Psychology, voL L p. 133. 



