cu. XIX.] ILLUSTRATIONS AND CRITICISMS. 239 



conduct according to invariable laws or pay the penalty in 

 some form of inevitable suffering, the difference in mental 

 attitude is so vast that we may well have a distinction in 

 terms to correspond to it. It is for this reason that I have 

 frequently contrasted Anthropomorphism and Cosmism as 

 the initial and final terms of a continuous progression. This, 

 however, is not the Comtean doctrine. Again, metaphysics, 

 as Comte understands it, being merely imperfect scientific 

 inquiry conducted by the aid of the subjective method be- 

 queathed by anthropomorphism, cannot be regarded as the 

 peculiar possession of any particular stage. 



But while Comte's theorem, in spite of these radical 

 defects, contains a germ of truth and has been found to be 

 eminently useful as a formula for intellectual development, I 

 cannot but be surprised that Comte should have regarded it 

 as the fundamental law of social progress, and still more that 

 such able writers as Mr. Mill and Mr. Lewes should at the 

 present day be found countenancing such an opinion. Does 

 this " law " explain how it was that Greek civilization pre- 

 maturely failed ? Does it throw any light upon the causal 

 connection between Eoman universal dominion and the 

 Christian sentiment of the brotherhood of men? Does it 

 recognize the distinction between the growth of a community 

 in size and its growth in structure, or hint to us that the 

 differences between Chinese and European civilization may 

 be summed up in the statement that China is only a stupen- 

 dous tribal community, while Komanized Europe is virtually 

 a federation of exceedingly heterogeneous national aggre- 

 gates ? And while, as we shall presently see, it uncon- 

 sciously recognizes that intellectual development is a con- 

 tinous process of adaptation, does it say anything about that 

 ^low process of emotional change by which the more har- 

 monioifs co-operation of societies and the more perfect 

 freedom of individuals are aliJce rendered possible ? Indeed 

 it says nothing about any of these things ; and i must think 



