CH.VI.] THE ATTITUDE OF PHILOSOPHY. 607 



been taught truths with which the false or inadequate beliefs 

 lire incompatible. The object of the scientific philosopher 

 therefore, will be to organize science and extend the boun- 

 daries of knowledge. 



If he obtains a fresh morsel of truth, he will proclaim it 

 to the world without dread of consequences, and let it bide it? 

 time until society comes, of its own free-will and intelligence, 

 to accept it. But while feeling it unnecessary, and often 

 unadvisable, to urge his views upon others, no craven fear of 

 obloquy will prevail upon him to conceal them when it is 

 desirable that they should be stated. He will state them 

 without mental reservation, and, above all, without fear of 

 any possible harm that can come from the unhampered quest 

 of truth. There is nothing more reprehensible than the 

 secret dread of ugly consequences with which so many 

 writers approach all questions of vital importance. They 

 shrink from lifting the veil which envelopes the Isis-statue 

 of Truth, lest instead of a beaming countenance they may 

 perchance encounter a ghastly death's head(. But philosophy 

 should harbour neither fears nor repugnances, nor qualms of 

 conscience. It is not for us, creatures of a day that we are, 

 and seeing but a little way into a limited portion of nature, 

 to say dictatorially, before patient examination, that we will 

 tot have this or that doctrine as part of our philosophic 

 treed. We must feel our way as best we can, gather with 

 unremitting toil what facts lie within our reach, and grate- 

 fully accept such conclusions as can honestly and by due 

 process of inference and verification be obtained for our 

 guidance. We are not the autocrats, but the servants and in- 

 terpreters of Nature ; and we must interpret her as she is, — 

 not as we would like her to be. That harmony which we 

 hope eventually to see established between our knowledge 

 nnd our aspirations is not to be realized by the timidity 

 which shrinks from logically following out either of two 

 upparently conflicting lines of thought — as in the question 



