LOGIC OF RECKPTS, 45 



The question, then, which we have to consider is whether 

 there is a difference of kind, or only a difference of degree, 

 between a recept and a concept. This is really the question 

 with which the whole of the present volume will be concerned, 

 and as its adequate treatment will necessitate somewhat 



Empfindungen ergibt sich die IVahrnehmung eincs Dinges : erst indem wir die 

 weisse Farbe sehen, die Harte fiihlen und den siissen Geschmack empfinden, 

 erkenncn wir ein Stiick Zucker" {Das Lcben der 6'tr/<? (1S57), 8, ii. 66). This 

 and other passages in the same work follow the teaching of Steinthal ; e.g. "Die 

 Anschauung von einem Dinge ist der Complex der sammtlichen Empfindungser- 

 kenntnisse, die wir von einem Dingo haben . . . die Anschauung ist eine Synthesis, 

 aber eine unmittelbare, die dutch die Einheit der Seele gegeben ist." And, 

 following both these writers, Friedrich Miiller says, "Diese Sammlung und 

 Einigung der verschiedenen Empfindungen gemass der in den Dingen verbun- 

 denen Eigenschaften heisst Anschauung " {Griindriss der Sprachwissenschaft^ i. 26). 

 On the other hand, their brother philologist, Geiger, strongly objects to this use 

 of the term Anschatumg, under which, he says, " wird theils etwas von der 

 Sinneswahrnehmung gar nicht Unterschiedenes verstanden, theils audi ein dunkles 

 Etwas, welches, ohne dass die Bedingungen und Ursachen zu erkennen sind, die 

 Einheit der Wahrnehmungen zu kleineren und grossern Complexen bewirken soli. 

 ... So dass ich eine solche * Synthesis ' nicht auch bei dem Thiere ganz ebenso 

 wie bei dem Menschen voraussetze : ich glaube im Gegentheile, dass es sich mit 

 der Sprache erst entwickelt " {Ursprung der Sprache, 177, 17S). Now, I have 

 quoted these various passages because they serve to render, in a brief and 

 instructive form, the different views which may be taken on a comparatively 

 simple matter owing to the want of well-defined terms. No doubt the use of the 

 term Aiischaming by the above writers is unfortunate ; but by it they appear to me 

 clearly to indicate a nascent idea of what I mean by a recept. They all three fail 

 to bring out this idea in its fulness, ina'^much as they restrict the powers of 

 non-conceptual "synthesis" to a grouping of simple perceptions furnished by 

 different sense-organs, instead of extending it to a synthesis of syntheses of 

 perceptions, whether furnished by the same or also by different senses. But these 

 three philologists are all on the right psychological track, and their critic Geiger 

 is quite wrong in saying that there can be no synthesis of (non-conceptual) ideas 

 without the aid of speech. As a matter of fact the dunkles Etwas which he 

 complains of his predecessors as importing into the ideation of animals, is an Etivas 

 which, when brought out into clearer light, is fraught with the highest importance. 

 For, as we shall subsequently see, it is nothing less than the needful psyihological 

 condition to the subsequent development both of speech and thought. The term 

 Apperception as used by some German psychologists is also inclusive of what 

 I mean by receptual ideation. But as it is also inclusive of conceptual, nothing 

 would here be gained by its adoption. Indeed F. Midler expressly restricts its 

 meaning to conceptual ideation, for he says, " Alle psychischen Processe bis 

 einschliesslich zur Perception lassen sich ohne Sprache ausfiihren und voll- 

 kommen begreifen, die Apperception dagegen lasst sich nur an der Hand der 

 Sprache denken " {Joe. cit. i., 29). 



