So MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN 



throwing out of view always a greater number of differences, 

 and seizing always on fewer similarities in the formation of 

 our classes, we arrive at length at the limit of our ascent in 

 the notion of being or existence." * 



Now, the point on which I wish to be perfectly clear about 

 is, that this process of conceptual ideation, whereby ideas 

 become general, must be carefully distinguished from the pro- 

 cesses of receptual ideation, whereby ideas become generic. 

 For these latter processes consist in particular ideas, which 

 are given immediately in sense perception, becoming by 

 association of similarity or contiguity automatically fused 

 together ; so that out of a number of such associated percepts 

 there is formed a recept, without the need of any intentional 

 co-operation of the mind in the matter. On the other hand, a 

 general idea, or concept, can only be formed by the mind 

 itself intentionally classifying its recepts known as such — or, in 

 the case of creating " higher concepts," performing the same 

 process with its already acquired general ideas, for the purpose 

 of constructing ideas still more general. A generic idea, then, 

 is generalized in the sense that a naturalist speaks of a lowly 

 organism as generalized — Le. as not yet differentiated into the 

 groups of higher and more specialized structures that subse- 

 quently emanate therefrom. But a general idea is generalized 

 in the sense of comprising a group of such higher and more 

 specialized structures, already formed and named under a 

 common designation with reference to their points of resem- 

 blance. Classification there is in all cases ; but in the recep- 

 tual order it is automatic, while in the conceptual order it is 

 introspective. 



So far as my analysis has hitherto gone, I do not 

 anticipate criticism or dissent from any psychologist, to what- 

 ever school he may belong. But there is one matter of 

 subordinate importance which I may here most conveniently 

 dispose of, although my views with regard to it may not meet 

 with universal assent. 



* Lectures t vol. ii., p. 290. 



