lyS MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN 



sophers since the time of Aristotle. And, as I have already 

 observed, it is a distinction which I myself fully recognize, 

 and believe to be the most important of all distinctions in 

 psychology. The only point of difference, therefore, between 

 my opinions and those — I will not say of Mr. Mivart, but — of 

 any other or possible opponent who understands the psycho- 

 logy of this subject, is on the question whether, in view of 

 the light which has now been shed on psychology by the 

 theory of evolution, this important distinction is to be 

 regarded as one of degree or as one of kind. I shall now 

 proceed to unfold the reasons which lead me to differ on this 

 point from Mr. Mivart, and so from all the still extensive 

 school of which he is, in my opinion, much the ablest 

 spokesman. 



We have seen that the distinction in question consists in 

 the presence or absence of the faculty now fully explained, of 

 reflective thought, and that of this faculty the simplest 

 manifestation is, as alleged by my opponents, that which 

 is afforded by "judgment." But we have also seen that 

 this faculty of judgment does not first appear in predication, 

 unless we extend the term so as to embrace all acts of 

 denomination. In other words, we have seen that judgment 

 first arises with conception — and necessarily so, seeing that 

 neither of these things can occur without the other, but both 

 arise as direct exhibitions of that faculty of self-conscious 

 or reflective thought of which they are everywhere the 

 immediate expression. I will, therefore, begin with a careful 

 analysis of conceptual judgment 



We must first recur to the distinctions set forth at the 

 close of the last chapter, where it was shown that, without 

 any prejudice to the question touching the distinction 

 between man and brute, there are five different stages of 

 intentional sign-making to be recognized — namely, the in- 

 dicative, the denotative, the connotative, the denominative, and 

 the predicative. From what has now been said regarding the 

 essentially predicative nature of all conceptual names, we 



