SPEECH. 191 



thus far confined myself to a mere designation of these great 

 and obvious distinctions. But seeing that even this prelimi- 

 nary step has necessitated a great deal of explanation, I feel 

 it may conduce to clearness if I end the present chapter with 

 a tabular statement of the sundry distinctions in question. 



By receptual judgments I will understand the same order 

 of ideation as Mr. Mivart expresses by his term " practical 

 inferences of brutes," instances of which have already been 

 given in Chapter III. 



By pre-conceptual judgments I will understand those acts 

 of virtual or rudimentary judgment which are performed by 

 children subsequent to the "practical inferences" which they 

 share with brutes, but prior to the advent of self-conscious 

 reflection. These pre-conceptual judgments may be expressed 

 either by gestures, connotative classifications, or by both com- 

 bined. Some instances of them have already been given in 

 the present chapter : further and better instances will be given 

 in the chapters which are to follow. 



Y>Y conceptual judgments I will understand full and complete 

 judgments in the ordinary acceptation of this term. 



Receptual judgment, then, has to do with recepts ; pre-con- 

 ceptual judgment with pre-concepts ; and true judgments 

 with true concepts. Or, conversely stated, receptual know- 

 ledge leads to receptual judgment {e.g. when a sea-bird dives 

 into water but alights upon land) : pre-conceptual knowledge 

 leads to pre-conceptual judgment in the statement of such 

 knowledge {e.g. when a child, by extending the name of a 

 dog to the picture of a dog, virtually affirms, though it does 

 not conceive, the resemblance which it perceives) : and, lastly, 

 conceptual knowledge leads to conceptual or veritable judg- 

 ment, in the statement of such knowledge known as knowledge 

 {e.g. when, in virtue of his powers of reflective thought, a man 

 not only states a truth, but states that truth as true). 



Thus far I doubt whether my opponents will find it easy 

 to meet me. They may, of course, cavil at some or all of the 

 above distinctions ; but, if so, it is for them to show cause for 



