THE TRANSITION IN THE INDIVIDUAL, 223 



further seen that this Is merely owing to the rapid advance in 

 the degree of receptual life which takes place in the latter — or, 

 in other words, that if a parrot resembled a dog in being able 

 to see the resemblance between objects and their pictures, 

 and also in being so much more able to understand the 

 meanings of words, then, without doubt, their connotative 

 extension of names would proceed further than it docs ; and 

 hence in this matter the parallel between a parrot and child 

 would proceed further than it docs. The only reason, there- 

 fore, why a child thus gradually surpasses a parrot in the 

 matter of connotation, is because the receptual life of a child 

 gradually rises to that of a dog — as I have already proved by 

 showing that the indicative or gesture-signs used by a child 

 after it has thus surpassed the parrot, are psychologically 

 identical with those which are used by a dog. Moreover, 

 where denotation is late in beginning and slow in developing 

 — as in the case of my own daughter — these indicative 

 signs admit, as we have seen, of becoming much more 

 highly perfected, so that under these circumstances a child 

 of two years will perform a little pantomime for the pur- 

 pose of relating its experiences. Now, this fact enables me 

 to dispense with the imaginary comparison of a dog that 

 is able to talk, or of a parrot as intelligent as a dog ; for the 

 fact furnishes me with the converse case of a child not able to 

 talk at the usual age. No one can suggest that the intelli- 

 gence of such a child at two years old differs in kind from 

 that of another child of the same age, who, on account of 

 having been earlier in acquiring the use of words, can afford 

 to become less proficient in the use of gestures.* The case 

 of a child late in talking may therefore be taken as a psycho- 



* Or, if any opponent were to suggest this, he would be committing 

 argumentative surrender. For the citadel of his argument is, as we know, the 

 faculty of conception, or the distinctively human power of objectifying ideas. 

 Now, it is on all hands admitted that this power is impossible in the absence of 

 self-consciousness. Will it, then, be suggested that my daughter had attained to 

 self-consciousness and the introspective contemplation of her own ideas before she 

 had attained to the faculty of speech, and therefore to the very condition to the 

 naming of her ideas? If so, it would follow that there may be concepts without 

 names, and thus the whole fortrcbs of my opponents would crumble away. 



