THE TRANSITION IN THE INDIVIDUAL. 22^ 



reccptual life of a child which, while surpassing^ the recep- 

 tual life of any brute, has not yet attained to the conceptual 

 life of a man. 



From what I have already said it must, I should suppose, 

 be now conceded that, at the place where the reccptual life of 

 a child first begins to surpass the reccptual life of any other 

 mammal, no psychological difference of kind can be affirmed. 

 Let us, therefore, consent to tap this pre-conccptual life at 

 a considerably higher level, and analyze the quality of 

 ideation which flows therefrom : let us consider the case of 

 a child about two years old, who is able to frame such a 

 rudimentary, communicative, or pre-conceptual proposition as 

 Dit ki (Sister is crying). At this age, as already shown, there 

 is no consciousness of self as a thinking agent, and, therefore, 

 no power of stating a truth as true. Dit is the denotative 

 name of one recept, ki the denotative name of another : the 

 object and the action which these two recepts severally 

 represent happen to occur together before the child's 

 observation : the child therefore denotes them both simul- 

 taneously — i.e. brings than into apposition. This it does 

 by merely following the associations previously established 

 between the recept of a familiar object with its denotative 

 name dit, and the recept of a frequent action with its 

 denotative name ki. The apposition in consciousness of 

 these two recepts, with their corresponding denotations, is 

 thus effected for the child by what may be termed the logic 

 of events: it is not effected by the child in the way of any 

 intentional or self-conscious grouping of its ideas, such as we 

 have seen to constitute the distinguishing feature of the logic 

 of concepts. 



Such being the state of the facts, I put to my opponents 

 the following dilemma. Either you here have judgment, or 

 else you have not. If you hold that this is judgment, you 

 must also hold that animals judge, because I have proved 

 a ready that (according to your own doctrine as well as 

 mine) the only point wherein it can be alleged that the 

 faculty of judgment differs in animals and in man consists 



