228 MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN 



in the presence or absence of self-consciousness. If, on the 

 other hand, you answer that here you have not judgment, 

 inasmuch as you have not self-consciousness, I will ask you 

 at what stage in the subsequent development of the child's 

 intelligence you would consider judgment to arise ? If to 

 this you answer that judgment first arises when self-conscious- 

 ness arises, I will ask you to note that, as already proved, the 

 growth of self-consciousness is itself a gradual process ; so that, 

 according to your present limitation of the term judgment, it 

 becomes impossible to say when this faculty does arise. In 

 point of fact, it grows by stages, pari passu with the growth 

 of self-consciousness. But, if so, where the faculty of stating 

 a truth perceived passes into the higher faculty of perceiving 

 the truth as true, there must be a continuous series of 

 gradations connecting the one faculty with the other. Up to 

 the point where this series of gradations begins, we have seen 

 that the mind of an animal and the mind of a man are 

 parallel, or not distinguishable from each other by any one 

 principle of psychology. Will you, then, maintain that up to 

 this time the two orders of psychical existence are identical 

 in kind, but that during its ascent through this final series of 

 gradations the human mind in some way becomes distinct in 

 kind, not merely from the mind of animals, but also from its 

 own previous self f If so, I must at this point part company 

 with you in argument, because at this point your argument 

 ends in a contradiction. If A and B are affirmed to be 

 similar in origin or kind, and if B is affirmed to grow into C 

 — or to differ from both A and B only in degree, — it becomes 

 a contradiction further to affirm that C differs from A in kind. 

 Therefore I submit that, so far as the pre-conceptual stage of 

 ideation is concerned, it is still argumentatively impossible 

 for my opponents to show that there is any psychological 

 difference of kind between man and brute. 



As regards this stage of ideation, then, I claim to have 

 shown that, just as there is a pre-conceptual kind of naming, 

 wherein originally denotative words are progressively extended 

 through considerable degrees of connotative meaning ; so 



