234 MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN. 



immeasurable change in the mind which presents it ; but, in 

 order to become so, it must be itself conditioned : it must 

 itself undergo a long and gradual development under the 

 guiding principles of a natural evolution. 



And, now, lastly, the second supplementary consideration 

 which I have to adduce is, that even in the case of a fully 

 developed self-conscious intelligence, both receptual and pre- 

 conceptual ideation continue to play an important part. That 

 is to say, even in the full-summed powers of the human 

 intellect, the three descriptions of ideation which I have 

 distinguished are so constantly and so intimately blended 

 together, that analysis of the adult mind corroborates the fact 

 already yielded by analysis of the infantile mind, namely, that 

 the distinctions (which I have been obliged to draw in order 

 to examine the allegations of my opponents) are all essenti- 

 ally or intrinsically artificial. My position is that Mind is 

 everywhere continuous, and if for purposes of analysis or 

 classification we require to draw lines of demarcation between 

 the lower and the higher faculties thereof, I contend that we 

 should only do so as an evolutionist classifies his animal or 

 vegetable species : higher or lower do not betoken differences 

 of origin, but differences of development. And just as the 

 naturalist finds a general corroboration of this view in the fact 

 that structural and functional characters are carried upwards 

 from lower to higher forms of life, thus knitting them all 

 together in the bonds of organic evolution ; so may the 

 psychologist find that even the highest forms of human 

 intelligence unmistakably share the more essential characters 

 met with in the lower, thus bearing testimony to their own 

 lineage in a continuous system of mental evolution. 



Let us, then, briefly contemplate the relations that obtain 

 in the adult human mind between the boasted faculties of 

 conceptual judgment, and the lower faculties of non-conceptual. 

 Although I agree with my opponents in holding that 

 predication (in the strict sense of the term) is dependent on 

 introspection, I further hold that not every statement made 



