282 MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN. 



importance. A great deal of discussion has been expended 

 over the question as to whether, or how far, aboriginal 

 language was indebted to the principle of onomatopoeia, or 

 the imitation by articulate names of sounds obviously dis- 

 tinctive of the objects or actions named. Of course, on 

 evolutionary principles we should be strongly inclined to 

 suppose that aboriginal language must have been largely 

 assisted in its formation by such intentional imitation of 

 natural sounds, seeing that of all forms of vocal expression 

 they admit of most readily conveying an idea of the object 

 or action named. And the same applies to the so-called 

 interjectional element in word-formation, or the utilization as 

 names of sounds which are naturally expressive of states of 

 human feeling. On the other hand, contempt has been 

 poured upon this theory as an adequate explanation of the 

 first beginnings of articulate speech, on the ground that it is 

 not supported either by history* or by the results of 

 philogenetic inquiry.! It is, however, forgotten by those 

 who argue on this side that names of onomatopoetic origin 



that they could not be anything but general" {^Science of Thought, p. 456). 

 Elsewhere, however, he says, "Although during the time when the growth of 

 anguage becomes historical and most accessible, therefore, to our observation, 

 the tendency certainly is from the general to the special, I cannot resist the convic- 

 tion that before that time there was a prehistoric period during which language 

 followed an opposite direction. During that period roots, beginning with special 

 meanings, became more and more generalized, and it was only after reaching that 

 stage that they branched off again into special channels" {ibid., pp. 383, 384). 

 Again, in his earlier work on the Science of Language (vol. i., pp. 425-432), he 

 argues in favour of terms having been aboriginally general. It will thus be seen 

 that with reference to this question he is not consistent. Touching the first of his 

 doctrines above quoted, Geiger pertinently observes that against such a conclusion 

 there lies the obvious absurdity, that if a language were to consist exclusively of 

 general terms, it would be ipso facto unintelligible to its own speakers; "for 

 what hope could there be of any mutual understanding with a language comprising 

 only such words as "to bind," "to sound," &c, ? {Ursprimg der Sp'ache, s. 16). 

 Clearly, Professor Max Muller's difficulties regarding this subject are quite 

 imaginary, and would disappear if he were to entertain the natural alternative that 

 there is no reason to suppose aboriginal words were exclusively restricted to being 

 either special or general — i.e. generic. 



* Bunsen, Philosophy of Universal History, ii. 131. 



t Professor Max MUller in all his works ; but it is observable that his opposition 

 to what he calls the " bow-wow and pooh-pooh theory " was more strenuous in his 

 earlier publications than it is in his later. 



