320 MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN. 



copula, but also an absence of any differentiation between the 

 subject and the predicate? The truth, in short, is, as now 

 so repeatedly shown, that not only the brute, but likewise the 

 young child — and not only the young child, but likewise 

 early man — and not only early man, but likewise savage man 



are all and equally unable to furnish the blank form of 



predication, as this has been slowly elaborated in the highest 

 ramifications of the human mind. 



Of course all this futile (because erroneous) argument on 

 the part of my opponents, rests upon the analysis of the proposi- 

 tion as this was given in the Aristotelian system of logic — an 

 analysis which, in turn, depends on the grammar of the Greek 

 language. Now, it goes without saying that the whole of this 

 system is obsolete, so far as any question of the origin either 

 of thought or of speech is concerned. I do not doubt the 

 value of this grammatical study, nor of the logic which is 

 founded upon it, provided that inferences from both are kept 

 within their legitimate sphere. But at this time of day to 

 regard as primitive the mode of predication which obtained 

 in so highly evolved a language as the Greek, or to represent 

 the "categories" of Aristotle's system as expressive of the 

 simplest elements of human thought, appears to me so 

 absurd that I can only wonder how intelligent men can have 

 committed themselves to such a line of argument* 



♦ I may remark that it was Aristotle who first fell into the error of identifying 

 the copula with the verb to be, by which it happens to be expressed in Greek. 

 For many centuries afterwards this error was a fruitful source of endless confusions ; 

 but it is curious to find a wholly new fallacy springing from it in the latter half of 

 the nineteenth century. Touching the subject and predicate, Aristotle, of course, 

 never contemplated any more primitive relation between them than that which 

 obtained in the only forms of speech with which he was acquainted. As regards 

 his " categories " the following remarks by Professor Max Miiller are worth 

 quoting : — 



"These categories, which proved of so much utility to the early grammarians, 

 have a still higher interest to the students of the science of language and thought. 

 Whereas Aristotle accepted them simply as the given forms of piedication in 

 Greek, after that language had become possessed of the whole wealth of its words, 

 we shall have to look upon them as representing the various processes by which 

 those Greek words, and all our own \^ords and thoughts, too, first assumed a 

 settled form. While Aristotle took all his words and sentences as given, and 



