326 MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN. 



CHAPTER XV. 



THE WITNESS OF PHILOLOGY {continued). 



In the last chapter we have been concerned with the philology 

 of predication. In the present chapter I propose to consider 

 the philology of conception. Of course the distinction is not 

 one that can be very sharply drawn, because, as fully shown 

 in my chapter on Speech, every concept embodies a judgment, 

 and therefore every denominative term is a condensed pro- 

 position. Nevertheless, as my opponents have laid so much 

 stress on full or formal predication, as distinguished from 

 conception, I have thought it desirable, as much as possible, 

 to keep these two branches of our subject separate. There- 

 fore, having now disposed of all opposition that can possibly 

 be raised on the ground of formal predication, I will con- 

 clude by throwing the light of philology on the origin of 

 material predication, or the passage of receptual denotation 

 into conceptual denomination, as this is shown to have 

 occurred in the pre-historic evolution of the race. 



It will be remembered that, under my analysis of the 

 growth of predication, much more stress has been laid in the 

 last chapter than in previous chapters on what I have called 

 the protoplasm of predication as this occurs in the hitherto 

 undifferentiated "sentence-word." While treating of the 

 psychology of predication in the chapter on Speech, I did not 

 go further back in my analysis than to point out how the 

 " nascent " or " pre-conceptual " propositions of young children 

 are brought about by the mere apposition of denotative terms 

 — such apposition having been shown to be due to sensuous 



