GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS. 4OI 



parrot, like a child, can easily be taught to do), it may be 

 said in a sense to be naming the dog ; but obviously it is not 

 predicating' any characters as belonging to a dog, or pLM-form- 

 ing any act of jiidgj/icnt with regard to a dog — as is the case, 

 for example, with a naturalist who, by means of his name 

 Canis, conceptually assigns that animal to a particular zoo- 

 logical genus. Although the parrot may never utter the 

 name " Bow-wow " save when it sees a dog, this fact is 

 attributable to the laws of association acting only in the 

 receptual sphere : it furnishes no shadow of a reason for 

 supposing that the bird ever thinks about the dog as a dog, 

 or sets the concept Dog before its mind as a separate object 

 of thought. Therefore, none of my opponents can afford to 

 deny that in one sense of the word there may be names 

 without concepts : whether as gestures or as words (" vocal 

 gestures"), there may be signs of things without these signs 

 presenting any vestige of predicative value. Now, it is in 

 order not to prejudice the case of my opponents, and thus 

 clearly to mark out the field of discussion, that I have insti- 

 tuted the distinction between names as receptual and concep- 

 tual, or denotative and denominative. 



This distinction having been clearly understood, the next 

 point was that both kinds of names admit of connotative 

 extension — denotative names within the receptual sphere, and 

 denominative within the conceptual. That is to say, when a 

 name has been applied to one thing, its use may be extended 

 to another thing, which is seen to belong to the same class 

 or kind. The degree to which such connotative extension of 

 a name may take place depends, of course, on the degree in 

 which the mind is able to take cognizance of resemblances 

 or analogies. Hence the process can go much further in 

 the conceptual sphere than it does in the receptual. But the 

 important point is that it unquestionably takes place in the 

 latter within certain limits. Nor is this anything more than 

 we should antecedently expect. For in the lengthy account 

 and from the numerous facts which I gave of the receptual 

 intelligence of brutes, it was abundantly proved that long 



