GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARK'S. 407 



suggests another, this another, and so on, without the need of 

 any immediate associations supplied from present objects 

 of sense. Furthermore, I have pointed out that rcccptual 

 ideation of this kind is not restricted to tlie images of sense- 

 perception ; but is largely concerned with the mental states 

 of other animals. That is to say, the logic of recepts, even' 

 in brutes, is sufficient to enable the mind to establish true 

 analogies between subjective states and the corresponding 

 states of other intelligences : animals habitually and accurately 

 interpret the mental states of other animals, while also well 

 knowing that other animals are able similarly to interpret 

 theirs. Hen^e, it must be further conceded that intelligent 

 animals recognize a world of ejects, as well as a world of 

 objects : mental existence is known to them ejectively, 

 though, as I allow, never thought upon subjectively. At this 

 stage of mental evolution the individual — whether an animal 

 or an infant — so far realizes its own individuality as to be 

 informed by the logic of recepts that it is one of a kind, 

 although of course it does not recognize either its own or any 

 other individuality as such. 



Nevertheless, there is thus given a rudimentary or nascent 

 form of self-consciousness, which up to the stage of develop- 

 ment that it attains in a brute or an infant may be termed 

 receptual self-consciousness ; while in the more advanced 

 stages which it presents in young children it may be termed 

 pre-conceptual self-consciousness. Pre-conceptual self-con- 

 sciousness is exhibited by all children after they have begun 

 to talk, but before they begin to speak of themselves in the 

 first person, or otherwise to give any evidence of realizing 

 their own existence as such. Later on, when true self-con- 

 sciousness does arise, the child, of course, is able to do this ; 

 and then only is supplied the condition sine gmi uon to a 

 reflection upon its own ideas — hence to a knowledge of names 

 as names, and so to a statement of truths as true. But long 

 before this stage of true or conceptual self-consciousness is 

 reached — whereby alone is rendered possible true or con- 

 ceptual predication — the child, in virtue of its pre-conceptual 

 27 



