40 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



which it derives that name, the quality of being a slow 

 mover, is an undesirable peculiarity. 



In regard to those concrete names which are not 

 general but individual, a distinction must be made. 



Proper names are not connotative : they denote 

 the individuals who are called by them ; but they do 

 not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to 

 those individuals. When we name a child by the 

 name Mary, or a dog by the name Caesar, these names 

 are simply marks used to enable those individuals to 

 be made subjects of discourse. It may be said, 

 indeed, that we must have had some reason for giving 

 them those names rather than any others : and this is 

 true; but the name, once given, becomes independent 

 of the reason. A man may have been named John 

 because that was the name of his father ; a town may 

 have been named Dartmouth, because it is situated at 

 the mouth of the Dart. But it is no part of the 

 signification of the word John, that the father of the 

 person so called bore the same name ; nor even of the 

 word Dartmouth, to be situated at the mouth of the 

 Dart. If sand should choke up the mouth of the 

 river, or an earthquake change its course, and remove 

 it to a distance from the town, there is no reason to 

 think that the name of the town would be changed. 

 That fact, therefore, can form no part of the significa- 

 tion of the word ; for otherwise, when the fact ceased 

 to be true, the name would cease to be applied. 

 Proper names are attached to the objects themselves, 

 and are not dependent upon the continuance of any 

 attribute of the object. 



But there is another kind of names, which, 

 although they are individual names, that is, predi- 

 cable only of one object, are really connotative. For, 

 although we may give to an individual a name utterly 



