46 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



In some cases it is not easy to decide precisely 

 how much a particular word does or does not connote ; 

 that is, we do not exactly know (the case not having 

 arisen) what degree of difference in the object would 

 occasion a difference in the name. Thus, it is clear 

 that the word man, besides animal life and rationality, 

 connotes also a certain external form ; but it would 

 be impossible to say precisely what form ; that is, to 

 decide how great a deviation from the form ordinarily 

 found in the beings whom we are accustomed to call 

 men, would suffice in a newly-discovered race to make 

 us refuse them the name of man. Rationality, also, 

 being a quality which admits of degrees, it has never 

 been settled what is the lowest degree of that quality 

 which would entitle any creature to be considered a 

 human being. In all such cases, the meaning of the 

 general name is so far unsettled, and vague ; mankind 

 have not come to any positive agreement about the 

 matter. When we come to treat of classification, we 

 shall have occasion to show under what conditions 

 this vagueness may exist without practical inconve- 

 nience ; and cases will appear, in which the ends of 

 language are better promoted by it than by complete 

 precision ; in order that, in natural history, for 

 instance, individuals or species of no very marked 

 character may be ranged with those more strongly 

 characterized individuals or species to which, in all 

 their properties taken together, they bear the nearest 

 resemblance. 



But this partial uncertainty in the connotation of 

 names can only be free from mischief when guarded 

 by strict precautions. One of the chief sources, 

 indeed, of lax habits of thought, is the custom of using 

 connotative terms without a distinctly ascertained 

 connotation, and with no more precise notion of 



