NAMES. 49 



but little augmentation to express a constantly in- 

 creasing number of objects and distinctions, and, 

 consequently, to express them in a manner progres- 

 sively more and more imperfect. 



To what degree this loose mode of classing and 

 denominating objects has rendered the vocabulary of 

 mental and moral philosophy unfit for the purposes of 

 accurate thinking, is best known to whoever has 

 most reflected on the present condition of those 

 branches of knowledge. Since, however, the intro- 

 duction of a new technical language as the vehicle of 

 speculations on moral subjects would not, in this 

 country at least, be tolerated, and if tolerated, would 

 deprive those subjects of the benefit of the habitual 

 feelings, which have grown round the established 

 phrases and the recognised groups, and which would 

 not for a long time take an equally strong hold of 

 new ones ; the problem for the philosopher, and one 

 of the most difficult which he has to resolve, is, in 

 retaining the existing phraseology, how best to 

 alleviate its imperfections. This can only be accom- 

 plished by giving to every general concrete name 

 which he has frequent occasion to predicate, a definite 

 and fixed connotation ; in order that it may be known 

 what attributes, when we call an object by that name, 

 we really mean to predicate of the object. And the 

 question of most nicety is, how to give this fixed 

 connotation to a name, with the least possible change 

 in the objects which the name is habitually employed 

 to denote ; with the least possible disarrangement, 

 either by adding or subtraction, of the group of 

 objects which it serves, in however imperfect a man- 

 ner, to circumscribe and hold together; and with the 

 least vitiation of the truth of any propositions which 

 are commonly received as true. 



VOL, I. E 



