56 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



called it the foundation of the relation, fundamentum 

 relationis. 



In this manner any fact, or series of facts, in which 

 two different objects are implicated, and which is 

 therefore predicable of both of them, may be either 

 considered as constituting an attribute of the one, or 

 an attribute of the other. According as we consider 

 it in the former, or in the latter aspect, it is connoted 

 by the one or the other of the two correlative names. 

 Father connotes the fact, regarded as constituting an 

 attribute of A : son connotes the same fact, as con- 

 stituting an attribute of B. It may evidently be 

 regarded with equal propriety in either light. And all 

 that appears necessary to account for the existence of 

 relative names, is, that whenever there is a fact, in 

 which two individuals are alike concerned, an attribute 

 grounded on that fact may be ascribed to either of 

 these individuals. 



A name, therefore, is said to be relative, when, over 

 and above the object which it denotes, it implies in 

 its signification the existence of another object, also 

 deriving a denomination from the same fact which is 

 the ground of the first name. Or (to express the 

 same meaning in other words) a name is relative, when, 

 being the name of one thing, its signification cannot 

 be explained but by mentioning another. Or we may 

 state it thus : when the name cannot be employed 

 in discourse, so as to have a meaning, unless the 

 name of some other thing than what it is itself the 

 name of, be either expressed or understood. We 

 may take our choice among these definitions. They 

 are all, at bottom, equivalent, being modes of 

 variously expressing this one distinctive circum- 

 stance that every other attribute of an object might, 

 without any contradiction, be conceived still to exist 



